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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
LEANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corpora-
tion doing business in Utah, 
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah 
corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, 
and SCOTT J. FLETCHER, a Utah 
resident, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1991). Defendants bring this appeal from the 
June 6, 1990 order by the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Leanna Broadwater, and 
denying defendants Old Republic Surety, Northwestern National 
Insurance Company, Atlas Stock Transfer, and Check Rite Inter-
national, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants 
also bring this appeal from the September 17, 1990 order awarding 
attorney's fees to plaintiff. Both orders were certified as final 
orders, pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., on October 19, 1990. 
Case No. 900508 
Priority No. 16 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
and denying defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on 
Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint? 
Standard of Review 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
this Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing 
party below. In determining whether those facts require, as a 
matter of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, this Court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of law 
that plaintiff's damages, if any, under Counts I and II of her 
amended complaint should be determined as of August 4, 1988? 
Standard of Review 
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact, this Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) . 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding plaintiff her 
attorney's fees, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 
1991), on Counts I and II of her amended complaint? 
2 
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Standard of Review 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact, this Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusion. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). In order to award attorney's fees under § 78-27-56, 
the court must determine that "the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . . . ." 
Id. The determination of "without merit" is a question of law, and 
therefore this Court reviews it for correctness. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The deter-
mination of "lack of good faith" is synonymous with the finding of 
"bad faith." A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is 
reviewed by this Court under the clearly erroneous standard, id. 
at 204. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 56(c) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991) are the determinative 
authorities on appeal. The texts of Rule 56(c) and (e) , U.R.C.P., 
and Utah Code Ann § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991), are set forth in their 
entirety, infra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Leanna Broadwater claims to be a bona 
fide purchaser of 8,000 shares of stock in Cardinal Energy Corp. 
("Cardinal"), now known as Check Rite International, Inc. ("Check 
Rite") (R. 311) Sometime prior to May 4, 1988, plaintiff 
3 
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presented those 8,000 shares of Cardinal stock, reflected by 
Certificate No. 258, to defendant Atlas Stock Transfer Company 
("Atlas") and requested that said shares be transferred into her 
name in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-306 (1953), (Id.) 
This appeal arise out of the alleged wrongful refusal of Atlas and 
Check Rite to transfer the subject shares into plaintiff's name. 
The 8,000 shares of stock in dispute were originally purchased 
on or about August 23, 1982, by defendant Scott J. Fletcher 
("Fletcher"). (R. 71) During the period of time Fletcher owned 
the stock, he informed Atlas, the stock transfer agent of Cardinal, 
that Certificate No. 258 had been lost or stolen. (R. 72) In 
order to obtain a replacement certificate, Fletcher was required to 
obtain a lost instruments bond in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-8-405(2)(b) (1953). Fletcher eventually obtained a lost 
instruments bond on November 23, 1982 from Northwestern National 
Insurance Company, the predecessor in interest of Old Republic 
Surety Company ("Old Republic"). (R. 73, 107) After tendering the 
lost instruments bond to Atlas, Atlas issued Fletcher a new 
certificate, Certificate No. 676, representing 8,000 shares of 
Cardinal stock. (Id.) Subsequently, Atlas placed a stop transfer 
order on Certificate No. 258. (R. 77) 
Apparently unknown to Fletcher, plaintiff on or before May 4, 
1988, presented the previously lost Certificate No. 258 to Atlas 
for transfer. (R. 77, 311) Due to the existence of the stop 
transfer order on Certificate No. 258, Atlas refused to transfer 
4 
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and register the subject shares in accordance with plaintiff's 
instructions. (R. 77, 111) Plaintiff was promptly notified of 
Atlas' refusal to transfer her stock by a letter of May 4, 1988 
from Atlas. (R. 11, 111) 
At the time Atlas refused to transfer Certificate No. 258, May 
4, 1988, there was no trading of Check Rite stock on which to base 
a fair market price for such stock. (R. 324-26) However, over the 
course of the next several months, the trading price of Check Rite 
stock fluctuated widely: 
Date Trading Price 
May 1-7, 1988 * 
May 8-14, 1988 * 
May 15-21, 1988 * 
May 22-28, 1988 * 
May 29 - June 4, 1988 * 
June 5-11, 1988 0.25 
June 12-18, 1988 0.41 
June 19-25, 1988 0.30 
June 26 - July 2, 1988 0.40 
July 3-9, 1988 0.38 
July 10-16, 1988 0.40 
July 17-23, 1988 0.65 
5 
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July 24-30, 1988 1.251 
•Signifies no trading during this time period. 
(R. 312, 324-26) 
Following receipt of Atlas7 correspondence of May 4, 1988, 
refusing plaintiff's requested transfer, plaintiff contacted Old 
Republic. (R. 77) Old Republic received first notice of a 
potential claim under its lost instruments bond on or about May 20, 
1988. (R. 519) Plaintiff, by means of affidavit, asserted that 
from May, 1988 until the filing of her suit on April 28, 1989, 
plaintiff was "mistreated, misled, and 'lulled' by certain of the 
defendants," specifically Old Republic. (R. 389-92, 413-16) 
Defendants denied any such wrongful conduct and submitted the 
affidavit of Paul S. Guardalabene to contradict and refute 
plaintiff's factual claims. (R. 518-24) 
Following defendants' continued refusal to transfer and 
register the subject shares in accordance with plaintiff's 
instructions, plaintiff brought suit on April 28, 1989. (R. 2) 
Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks damages in excess of $250,000 
against the various defendants for alleged statutory wrongful 
refusal to transfer, conversion, breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, breach of third-party beneficiary contract, 
bad faith, aiding and abetting, negligence, violation of § 12(2) of 
the 1933 Federal Securities Act, violation of § 61-1-22(1)(b) of 
!Plaintiff also submitted a conflicting affidavit claiming a 
trading price of 1 5/16 as of July 28, 1988. (R. 388) 
6 
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the Utah Uniform Securities Act, fraud, and violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). (R. 
98-100) Plaintiff's amended complaint also seeks attorney's fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991). (R. 98) 
Following brief discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
partial summary judgment on Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended 
complaint for conversion and wrongful refusal to transfer of the 
subject stock. (R. 310-24, 352-78) For purposes of the cross 
motions for partial summary judgment, the parties assumed arguendo 
that Atlas and Check Rite's actions were wrongful and constituted 
a "conversion" of plaintiff's stock. The parties' principal 
dispute, therefore, was over the proper time for calculating 
plaintiff's damages. (R. 313) In conjunction with defendants' 
motion for partial summary judgment, defendants also moved to 
strike various affidavits submitted by plaintiff in support of her 
cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 426-31, 609-12) 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment also included a 
prayer for an unspecified award of attorney's fees. (R. 372) 
Oral argument on the motions was heard before The Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno on May 1, 1990. On June 6, 1990, The Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, entered an order granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, 
finding that plaintiff's damages should be determined as of ninety 
days after the conversion, when the Check Rite stock reached its 
highest value after the conversion. (R. 710-12) The lower court 
7 
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also denied defendants' motion to strike the affidavits submitted 
by plaintiff in support of her motion. (Id.) The trial court also 
initially took the matter of plaintiff's request for attorney fees 
under advisement. (R. 647, 710-12) Subsequently, on September 6, 
the trial court entered judgment awarding plaintiff attorney's fees 
in the amount of one-third of the principal judgment under Counts 
I and II of her amended complaint. (R. 818-19) On October 19, 
1991, the trial court directed that the judgments and orders 
entered on July 6, 1990 and September 27, 1990, be certified as 
final and appealable under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. 842-45) 
Defendants now bring this appeal from the above-mentioned judgments 
and orders. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order for a court to grant plaintiff's motion for partial 
summary judgment, plaintiff has to establish by competent evidence 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
each and every element of plaintiff's cause of action for 
conversion and wrongful refusal to transfer stock. The principal 
dispute between the parties in this case was over the proper time 
for calculating plaintiff's damages for conversion and wrongful 
refusal to transfer stock. Therefore, plaintiff has the burden of 
establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
with respect to calculating plaintiff's damages within the 90-day 
period of May 4, 1988, when the conversion occurred, and August 4, 
1988, the date at which the trial court fixed the damages. 
8 
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Utah adheres to the "New York rule" which provides that 
damages for the conversion of goods which fluctuate in value are 
fixed at the highest market price the converted goods reach at any 
time between the time the injured party has notice of the 
conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter. Although courts 
have not uniformly applied the "New York rule", the overwhelming 
majority of courts have held that a period of thirty days or less 
constitutes a "reasonable time", as a matter of law, in which to 
fix damages for the conversion of stock certificates. 
The trial court, in finding ninety days to be a "reasonable 
time" for fixing damages in this case relied on disputed and 
immaterial facts related to the alleged acts or omissions of Old 
Republic. By relying on such disputed and immaterial facts, the 
trial court erred in not holding as a matter of law that 
plaintiff's damages should be fixed at the highest price the 
subject stock reached within thirty days of plaintiff learning of 
the conversion. 
The trial court also erred in awarding plaintiff attorney's 
fees under Counts I and II of plaintiff's amended complaint. It is 
well established that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 requires that the 
trial court make specific findings as to the determination of the 
"merit" or "bad faith" of the nonprevailing party's action or 
defense to the action. In this case, the trial court made no 
findings as to merit or bad faith when awarding plaintiff's 
attorney's fees. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any other 
9 
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basis to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the 
plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINDING 
THAT A NINETY-DAY PERIOD WAS THE PROPER TIME 
FOR CALCULATING PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
A. Utah Has Adopted the "New York Rule" to Fix Damages for the 
Conversion of and Wrongful Refusal to Transfer Stock. 
Count I of plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that 
defendants Atlas and Check Rite failed to fulfill their statutory 
duty to effect a stock registration transfer requested by plaintiff 
on or about May 4, 1988. Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint 
alleges that the actions of Atlas and Check Rite tortiously 
interfered with her right to control and possess those shares, and 
thus constitute conversion. Although plaintiff asserts separate 
causes of action, courts generally treat the wrongful refusal to 
transfer stock as an act of conversion. F. Kristy and R. Appel, 
The Transfer of Stock. § 271 (5th Ed. 1975). Utah follows that 
general rule. See Cowan and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 
P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1984); Baalin v. Earl-Eagle Mining Co., 5 Utah 
572, 184 P.2d 190, 194 (1919); Mundt v. Commercial National Bank of 
Ogden, 35 Utah 90, 99 P.2d 454, 456 (1909). 
The key dispute between the parties is over the proper time 
for calculating plaintiff's damages for conversion and wrongful 
10 
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refusal to transfer stock• As a general rule, the measure of 
damages for conversion is the fair market value of the converted 
goods at the time of conversion. See Murdock v, Blake, 26 Utah 2d 
22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Lowe v. Rosenlof. 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 
418 (1961). However, most courts have adopted different rules for 
determining damages when the fair market value of the converted 
goods such as stocks, fluctuates widely. Approximately 10 states, 
including Utah, have adopted the "New York rule," whereby converted 
stock is valued at the highest market price of the stock between 
the time the customer has notice of the conversion and a reasonable 
time thereafter. This rule gives the stockholder a reasonable time 
within which to decide whether to go into the marketplace and 
replace the stock. The rule also gives the stockholder the option 
of claiming the stock's market value at the time of conversion, to 
afford him the basic remedy in a falling market. On the other 
hand, the New York rule also requires an injured party to mitigate 
his damages, by not permitting the party to sit idly by while the 
value of the converted stock rises. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1286, 
1322-23 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the New York rule in Western 
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 
192 P. 664 (1920). In Western Securities, one Clark delivered more 
than 29,000 shares of stock in the defendant corporation to the 
corporation's officers, also party defendants, as collateral for 
five promissory notes. After Clark delivered the shares as 
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collateral, the defendants sold the shares for $1,60 per share. 
Over the next four months, the value of the shares increased to 
more than $2.00 per share. Plaintiff brought suit, claiming that 
the defendants had wrongfully converted his stock. Judgment was 
entered for the plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing 
and remanding the lower court's judgment, clearly recognized and 
adopted the New York rule: 
The ordinary rule governing the measure of 
damages in cases where the pledge wrongfully 
converts the property pledged is the market 
value of the property pledged with interest 
from the time it was converted. If the 
pledged property consists of stocks or bonds 
of a fluctuating market price, then the 
measure of damages, under the New York rule, 
is the highest market price of such stocks or 
bonds within a reasonable time after the 
pledgor obtained notice of the sale of the 
stock or bonds which was illegally made. . . . 
As soon as the pledgor receives notice that a 
pledgee has converted his stocks or bonds, he 
may go into the market and replace them, or, 
if he chooses, he may rely on his damages. He 
must, however, act within a reasonable time, 
and cannot by his own will extend that 
time. . . . Utah is one of the jurisdictions 
wherein the New York rule has been adopted. 
Western Securities, 192 P. at 672-3. See also. Lake v. Pinder, 13 
Utah 2d 76, 368 P.2d 593, 594 (1962) (In an action for failure to 
deliver stock, court recognized that the aggrieved party is 
entitled to be paid "the highest market value of such stock within 
a reasonable time thereafter.11) 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc. v. Talbott, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957), also recognized 
12 
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that Utah adheres to the New York rule. In Nephi Processing Plant, 
the court reviewed whether the trial court had erred in instructing 
that the jury could award the highest price the converted good had 
been sold for between the time of the conversion and a reasonable 
time after plaintiffs obtained notice of the conversion. In 
sustaining the trial courts jury instruction, the Tenth Circuit 
noted: 
The Utah courts have recognized that as a 
general rule the measure of damage for 
conversion of property is the value of the 
property at the time of the conversion, plus 
interest. It has been held, however, that the 
rule has no application where the converted 
chattels are of a kind which have a 
fluctuating market value. In such cases the 
measure of damages is the highest market price 
of the property within the reasonable time 
after the owner has notice of the conversion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has accepted this rule. 
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King 
Consolidated Mining Co., supra. 
Id. at 774 (citations omitted). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Utah courts adhere to 
the New York rule. As a result, plaintiff was entitled only to 
recover the highest value her stock reached within a "reasonable 
time" of her learning of Atlas' refusal to transfer her shares. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That a Ninety-day Period Was 
a "Reasonable Time" to Fix Damages Under the New York Rule. 
The determination of what is a "reasonable time" under the New 
York rule for determining the value of stock has been held to be a 
question of law to be determined by the trial court. See Mullin v. 
J.J. Ouinlin & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 87 N.E. 1078 (1909); Fullev v. 
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Wasserman. 319 Pa. 420, 179 A, 595 (1935). Utah courts also have 
recognized that a "reasonable time" may be determined as a matter 
of law. In Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 
P.2d 748 (1948), the court reversed a judgment in favor of the 
defendants in a lawful detainer action. One of the principal 
issues on appeal was whether the plaintiffs had permitted the 
defendants a "reasonable time" in which to make up overdue payments 
under a real estate contract. In reversing the trial courts 
judgment, the Utah Supreme Court held as a matter of law that 23 
days' notice constituted a "reasonable time." In so ruling, the 
court stated, "Where the facts surrounding are undisputed, as they 
are in this case, this court may determine, as a matter of law, 
what is reasonable time." Pacific Development, 195 P.2d at 751. 
The material facts surrounding the case at hand are also 
undisputed. On May 4, 1988, plaintiff was given notice of Atlas 
and Check Rite's conversion of and wrongful refusal to transfer 
Certificate No. 258 into plaintiff's name. Atlas and Check Rite 
continued to refuse to transfer and register the subject shares in 
accordance with plaintiff's instructions from May to August, 1988. 
During this time, the value of plaintiff's Check Rite stock 
fluctuated widely. Since the material facts surrounding this case 
were undisputed, the trial court could determine, as a matter of 
law, what was a "reasonable time." The trial court, however, erred 
in concluding that 90 days was a "reasonable time" in this case. 
14 
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1. Thirty Days Rather Than Ninety Days Constituted a 
"Reasonable Time" to Fix Damages Under the New York Rule, 
Although courts have not recognized a single length of time as 
the definitive standard for valuing converted stock under the New 
York rule, the overwhelming majority of courts have held that a 
period of 30 days or less constitutes a "reasonable time." Courts 
holding that one month constitutes a reasonable time within the New 
York rule include: Isonbercr v. Haupt, 235 A.D. 123, 256 N.Y.S. 411 
(1932); Hamel v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 251 N.Y. 559, 168 
N.E. 427 (1931); 0/Connor v. Graff, 186 A.D. 116, 173 N.Y.S. 730 
(1919), aff'd., 230 N.Y. 552, 130 N.E. 890 (1920); Strickland v. 
Magoun, 119 A.D. 113, 104 N.Y.S. 425 (1907), aff'd., 190 N.Y. 545, 
83 N.E. 1132 (1907); and Burhorn v. Lockwood, 71 A.D. 301, 75 
N.Y.S. 828 (1902), appeal dismissed, 177 N.Y. 539, 69 N.E. 1121 
(1903), reh'g denied, 177 N.Y. 554, 69 N.E. 1121 (1903). 
On at least two occasions, courts have construed two and a 
half to three weeks to be a "reasonable time." See Gelb v. Zimet 
Bros., Inc., 34 Misc. 2d 401, 228 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1962), aff'd., 18 
A.D.2d 967, 237 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1963); Rosenbaum v. Stiebel, 137 A.D. 
912, 122 N.Y.S. 131 (1910). 
The following courts have also construed periods of time less 
than two weeks to be reasonable under the New York Rule: Citizen 
Street R. Co. v. Robbinsf 144 Ind. 671, 42 N.E. 916 (1896), Supp. 
Op., 144 Ind. 687, 43 N.E. 649 (1896) (11 days); Satterwhite v. 
Harriman National Bank & Trust Co.f 13 F. Supp. 493 (D. N.Y. 1935) 
(10 days); Keller v. Halsev, 130 A.D. 598, 115 N.Y.S. 564 (1909) (9 
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days); In Re Dickinson, 171 A.D. 486, 157 N.Y.S. 248 (1916) (8 
days); James Wood General Trading Establishment v. Coe, 191 F.Supp. 
330 (D. N.Y. 1961), rev'd. on other grounds, 297 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 
1961) (1 week) ; Phillips v. Bank of Athens Trust Co., 202 Misc. 
698, 119 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1952) (1 week); Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Co. v. Walston & Co.. 291 N.Y.S.2d 366, 238 N.E.2d 754 (1968) (6 
days); Durant v. Block. 113 N.J. 509, 174 A. 889 (1934) (2 days). 
2. A Thirty-Day Period Meets the Test for Determining What 
Constitutes a "Reasonable Time" to Calculate Damages 
Under the New York Rule. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recently developed a test 
for determining what constitutes a "reasonable time" in cases such 
as the instant case. The Minnesota court's standard lends even 
more support to the premise that the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and denying 
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. In Hornblower and 
Weeks-Hemphill Noyes v. Lazere, 301 Minn. 462, 222 N.W.2d 799, 807 
(1974), the Minnesota court stated: 
[W]e conclude that the most important question 
to be considered by the trier of fact in 
determining the reasonable period of time is 
what amount of time is necessary to allow the 
owner of the stock a reasonable opportunity to 
consult counsel, to employ other brokers, and 
to watch the market in order to determine 
whether and at what price to repurchase other 
stocks in place of those converted. 
Id. at 807. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff learned on or about May 4, 
1988 that Atlas and Check Rite would not transfer her stock in 
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accordance with her request. Within two weeks of learning of the 
conversion, plaintiff contacted Atlas and Old Republic about her 
situation. Plaintiff's own affidavits state that at that time she 
was in contact with various brokers making markets in Check Rite 
stock and was familiar with market conditions. (R. 389-92, 413-16) 
It also appears from her affidavits that plaintiff had some degree 
of expertise in securities. When applying the Hornblower test to 
the facts of this case, it is clear that thirty days was ample time 
for the plaintiff to consult counsel, to employ other brokers and 
to watch the market in order to determine whether and at what price 
to purchase other stocks to replace those which had been converted. 
Therefore, under the Hornblower test, thirty days would constitute 
a "reasonable time" to fix damages in this case. 
C. The Facts That Plaintiff Used to Support Her Argument for a 
Ninety-Day Period Were Disputed and Immaterial. 
Furthermore, in urging the trial court to grant her motion for 
partial summary judgment, plaintiff used numerous factual matters 
to support her ninety-day damage period that were not only 
disputed, but also irrelevant and immaterial to the alleged 
tortious conversion of plaintiff's stock by Atlas and Check Rite. 
Plaintiff offered only self-serving statements that as of May 4, 
1988, she did not understand that the actions of defendants Atlas 
and Check Rite constituted conversion. Plaintiff also pointed to 
the alleged conduct of Old Republic as excusing her knowledge of 
the conversion. She argues that through June, July, and August of 
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1988, Old Republic purposely lulled her into believing that they 
would remedy her predicament. 
Old Republics actions with regard to the plaintiff in June, 
July, and August of 1988 are irrelevant and immaterial to the 
determination of when to fix the damages for the conversion of 
plaintiff's stock by Atlas and Check Rite for several reasons. 
First, Old Republic did not convert plaintiff's stock. Second, Old 
Republic had no reason to purposefully lull the plaintiff into 
believing that they would remedy her predicament while the price of 
her stock increased. Finally, there was no basis in fact or law 
for plaintiff to expect Old Republic to directly remedy the 
conversion of Atlas and Check Rite. Therefore, the alleged actions 
or omissions were irrelevant and immaterial to the determination of 
the appropriate time for calculating damages flowing from the 
conversion of plaintiff's stock. 
Even if the alleged actions or omissions of Old Republic were 
relevant to the determination of when to fix plaintiff's damages, 
those factual matters were in dispute, and should have precluded 
summary judgment. If one compares plaintiff's affidavits with the 
affidavit of Paul S. Guardalabene, Assistant Claims Attorney for 
Old Republic, one finds the facts surrounding Old Republic's 
conduct are in conflict. For example, in his affidavit, 
Guardalabene states that he never indicated or inferred that 
plaintiff had a right to recover her damages directly from Old 
Republic. (R. 518-24) Plaintiff's affidavits state, without any 
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factual foundation, that Guardalabene had essentially told 
plaintiff that Old Republic could settle directly with her, and 
that plaintiff should rely on Old Republic to resolve the dispute. 
(R. 389-92, 413-16) Such "factual" assertions were clearly in 
dispute at the time of Judge Uno's ruling. 
Based on the foregoing authority that thirty days rather than 
ninety days are a "reasonable time" under the New York rule, and 
that plaintiff's "lulling" facts are either irrelevant or in 
dispute, this Court should rule that the trial court erred in 
granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Also, 
based on this overwhelming weight of authority, this Court should 
award defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I 
and II of plaintiff's complaint and fix her damages at a date no 
later than June 3, 1988, 30 days after she learned of the 
conversion of her stock. 
D. The Affidavits Upon Which Plaintiff Relied Did Not Comport 
With the Requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P., and Should Have 
Been Stricken. 
In conjunction with the parties' cross motions for partial 
summary judgment, defendants moved to strike the affidavits of 
plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment, and Penny Grace. (R. 
42 6-27) Defendants sought to strike the subject affidavits because 
the affidavits did not comply with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Rule 
56(e), U.R.P.C., governs the use of affidavits in conjunction with 
motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(e) states in pertinent part 
as follows: 
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Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense 
Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such pertinent facts as would be 
admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein . . . . 
At the time of hearing, defendants pointed out the 
deficiencies in the affidavits upon which plaintiff relied. 
Plaintiff's affidavits contained opinion, legal conclusions and 
facts not supported by adequate foundation. (R. 389-92, 413-16, 
428-31) The Chuck Burton affidavit contained hearsay, and lacked 
adequate foundation for many of the facts stated therein. (R. 379-
80, 428-31) The affidavit from Potter Investment Co. likewise 
contained hearsay, lacked adequate foundation for many of the facts 
found therein, and impermissible legal conclusions. (R. 381-83, 
428-31) Finally, the affidavit of Penny Grace lacked foundation 
for the facts stated therein. (R. 387-88) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973), affirmed a trial court's refusal 
to consider an affidavit containing unsubstantiated opinions and 
conclusions. In Walker, the action was brought to recover judgment 
for an amount stipulated to in a settlement agreement. Plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion with an 
affidavit from defendant's president containing unsubstantiated 
opinions and conclusions. Summary judgment was entered in favor of 
plaintiff and defendant appealed. In affirming the summary 
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judgment, the court stated that: 
Statements made merely on information and 
belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and 
opinion testimony that would not be admissible 
if testified to at trial may not properly be 
set forth in an affidavit. Id. at 542. 
See also Treloqgan v. Trelocrcran, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
Likewise, in the instant case, the affidavits of plaintiff, 
Chuck Burton, Potter Investment and Penny Grace did not comport 
with the requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P., and should have been 
disregarded in considering the merits of the parties' respective 
cross motions for.partial summary judgment. In refusing to strike 
the affidavits, the trial court committed error. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PREVAILING ON COUNTS I 
AND II OF HER AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
On September 6, 1990, the trial court entered judgment 
awarding plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of one-third of 
the principal judgment under Counts I and II of her amended 
complaint. Assuming that the trial court was correct in awarding 
partial summary judgment to plaintiff on Counts I and II of her 
amended complaint, the trial court nevertheless erred in awarding 
attorney's fees to plaintiff. 
Utah has consistently followed the well-established rule that 
attorney's fees should be awarded to the prevailing party only if 
they are provided for by contract or statute. Watkiss & Campbell 
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v, Foa & Son, 808 P. 2d 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing Canyon Country 
Store v, Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989)); Turtle 
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982) • In the case at hand, it is undisputed that there is no 
contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees. Therefore, 
plaintiff could recover attorney's fees only if such an award is 
provided for by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991) provides as statutory 
basis for a trial court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party whether there is evidence of "bad faith" litigation. 
Plaintiff's prayer for relief under Counts I and II, also asserted 
an entitlement to an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56. Section 78-27-56 provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense of the action 
was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award 
no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1) , but only if the 
court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an 
affidavit of impecuniosity in the 
action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the 
reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
Id. 
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In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court in Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa 
& Sons, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), examined the requirements of an 
award under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Watkiss involved an action 
by a law firm to recover fees from a former client. The trial 
court in the case awarded summary judgment in favor of the law 
firm. The trial court also awarded attorney's fees to the law 
firm, however it did not make specific findings as to how or why it 
awarded these attorney's fees. 
On appeal, the law firm argued that a trial court is not 
required to enter specific findings as to why it awarded attorney's 
fees, but rather that such specific findings are required only when 
the trials court does not award attorney's fees. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected such an argument by stating: 
[W]hen a party seeks recovery of attorney's 
fees under § 78-27-56, the trial court must 
make specific findings with regard to each 
element of the statute. Specific findings 
further the ends of justice by allowing 
appeals court to better review the trial 
court's award. Without specific findings, a 
reviewing court cannot determine whether the 
award of attorney fees was based upon a 
meritless claim brought in bad faith or simply 
because the recovering party prevailed. 
Id. at 1068. 
Under Watkiss, a trial court must make specific findings as to 
why it awarded attorney's fees. No such findings were made in this 
case. (R. 818-19) The trial court's order gives no indication, 
let alone specific findings, as to why the trial court awarded 
attorney's fees. The order does not state that defendants' claims 
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were without merit and brought in bad faith. The order likewise 
does not even state that attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to 
§ 78-27-56. The award of attorney's fees in this case does not 
give any guidance nor to this court as to why the trial court made 
such an award. 
Based on the lack of specific findings in the trial court's 
order awarding attorney's fees and the Supreme Court of Utah's 
ruling in Watkiss requiring such specific findings, this court 
should find that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees 
to plaintiff. The issue of attorney's fees should be either be 
reversed as a matter of law or be vacated and remanded to the trial 
court for a determination of whether, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56, attorney's fees should be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request that 
this court reverse the order granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff on Counts I and II and order that the trial 
court grant defendants' cross motion for partial summary judgment 
on Counts I and II. The defendants also respectfully request this 
court to reverse or in the alternative vacate and remand for 
further proceedings the trial court's order granting attorney's 
fees to plaintiff. 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
ATTORNEY for Plaintiff 72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater hereby alleges and complains that Defendants jointly and 
severally or individually where otherwise indicated as follows: 
PARTIES 
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1. Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is a Salt Lake County resident. She is the lawful and 
undisputed assignee or successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., the purchaser of 
certain shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation subject to this dispute. 
2. Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer Corporation, ("Atlas") is a Utah corporation doing 
business in Salt Lake County. It is an obligee on the open penalty indemnity bond subject 
hereto. 
3. Defendant Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") n/k/a Check-Rite International, 
Inc., ("Check-Rite") is a publicly held Utah corporation and the issuer of the securities 
subject to this dispute. Its transfer agent is Atlas and it is an obligee on the open penalty 
indemnity bond subject hereto. 
4. Defendant Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
("Northwestern") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed as a foreign corporation to do 
business in Utah and further licensed with the Utah Insurance Department to do business in 
this state. It is the obligor on the open penalty indemnity bond subject hereto. 
5. Defendant Old Republic Surety ("Old Republic") is a Wisconsin corporation licensed 
as a foreign corporation to do business in the state of Utah and further licensed with the 
Utah Insurance Department to do business in this state. It is believed to have acquired 
Defendant Northwestern and therefore it is the assignee or sucoessor-in-interest of all 
claims as against Defendant Northwestern. 
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6. Defendant Scott J. Fletcher is a Utah resident. He is the purchaser of and principal 
on the open penalty indemnity bond at issue in this case which he obtained through fraud as 
set forth below. 
JURISDICTION 
7. Jurisdiction over the parties is based on the fact that state courts are of general 
jurisdiction and Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic have consented to jurisdiction 
by being licensed in this state to do business. Jurisdiction is further based on 18 U.S.C. 
§1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. On August 17,1981, Defendant Fletcher placed an order to sell six thousand 
(6,000) shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation ("Cardinal") with Potter Investment Company 
("Potter"), a local securities broker-dealer as evidenced by Exhibit "A" hereto, a true and 
correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation. On the same date, Fletcher placed a 
similar order with Potter to sell 2,000 Cardinal shares represented by Certificate 568 for the 
account of Jeanne Winder, Fletcher's neighbor, as further set forth below. 
9. On August 27,1981, Defendant Fletcher placed a another order with Potter to sell 
two thousand (2,000) additional shares of Cardinal as evidenced by Exhibit "B" hereto, a true 
and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation. 
10. To honor Fletcher's 8,000 share sale orders, Fletcher delivered Cardinal 
certificate No. 258, representing eight thousand (8,000) shares, ^ and issued in his name to 
Potter on 7/27/81. 
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11. On 7/27/81, Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of $1,699.80 as 
payment for his sale of six thousand (6,000) Cardinal shares. It is undisputed that such 
check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account as evidenced by Exhibit 
"C" hereto, a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse sides thereof. 
12. On 8/4 /81, Potter issued a check to Fletcher in the amount of five hundred sixty 
dollars ($560.00) as payment for his 4/27/81 sale of two thousand (2,000) Cardinal shares. 
It is undisputed that such check was received by Fletcher and deposited in his bank account 
as evidenced by Exhibit "D", a true and correct copy of such Potter check, front and reverse 
sides thereof. 
13. On or about September 21, 1981, Plaintiff Broadwater, acting on behalf of KASU 
Securities, purchased eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal stock from Potter. Potter 
delivered certificate No. 258 to Plaintiff which had been signed over by Fletcher and 
properly signatured guaranteed. Such is known in the securities industry as "street stock" 
and certificates representing such are negotiable instruments. 
14. Approximately one (1) year later, on or about August 23, 1982, Fletcher falsely 
claimed that certificate No. 258 had been lost or stolen. Thereupon Fletcher posted a 
bond through Defendant Northwestern (now Old Republic) and paid the premium thereon. 
Fletcher was issued a new Cardinal certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000) 
shares. A true and correct copy on such bond which is the subject of this dispute, the 
premium of which was accepted by Defendant Northwestern, is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "E", denominated by bond No. UMI871385. 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15. Such open penalty indemnity bond, Exhibit "E" hereto, sets forth Defendant 
Northwestern as the obligor thereon and Defendants Atlas and Cardinal (now Check-Rite) 
as obligees. 
16. On or about August 9. 1982, Defendant Fletcher also sold, through Potter, 
Cardinal certificate No. 676, also representing eight thousand (8,000) shares and also 
registered in his name. A true and correct copy of Fletcher's stock sale confirmation is 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Plaintiff's Exhibit "F. 
17. Defendant Fletcher received $1,374.20 from Potter on 8/25/82 for his sale of 
certificate 676 as evidenced by Exhibit "G" hereto, a true and correct copy of Potter's 
returned check, front and reverse sides thereof, further evidencing deposit of such in 
Fletcher's bank account. 
18. It is undisputed that after selling certificate No. 676 and receiving valuable 
consideration therefor, Fletcher on or about November 23. 1983. claimed and alleged that 
Cardinal certificate No. 676 had been lost or stolen. 
19. On November 23, 1983. Fletcher, after having previously sold certificate No. 676, 
and having declared it lost or stolen, caused Defendant Northwestern to issue an additional 
open penalty indemnity bond to cancel certificate 676. A true and correct copy of this 
additional bond, obtained from Defendant Northwestern for Fletcher's benefit, is attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "H" and denominated by Bond No. 
UMI902168. 
20. A new replacement certificate was then issued to Fletcher on said date by Atlas in 
reliance on such bond. 
- 5 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21. Subsequently, certificate 676 surfaced and when it was submitted for transfer, 
Defendant Northwestern, after demand by Defendant Atlas, paid sufficient funds to replace 
that certificate in the amount of eight thousand (8,000) shares for its bona fide purchaser. 
22. It is thus undisputed that Fletcher was issued an additional eight thousand (8,000) 
shares on at least two occasions or at total of 16,000 shares as a result of his posting two 
open penalty indemnity bonds through Defendant Northwestern. 
23. Based on the foregoing, Fletcher was able to unlawfully obtain an additional 
sixteen thousand (16,000) shares to which he was not entitled and which he is also believed 
to have subsequently sold, as with the first sixteen thousand shares (16,000), in interstate 
commerce. 
24. The foregoing actions of Fletcher were a fraud in that Fletcher had not lost or 
had stolen either certificate 258 or 676 inasmuch as he had sold such certificates and knew 
or had to have known he had done such. 
25. The two frauds of Fletcher each constitute a "predicate act" of racketeering as 
contemplated in 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act and a "pattern" in that regard as contemplated thereunder. 
26. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Fletcher was and has been under 
criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney Genernl's office for such frauds, an investigation 
at one time spear-headed by David Baskam, a former Assistant Attorney General. Plaintiff 
further believes that Fletcher has been brought before an LDS Bishop's Court for his history 
and pattern of fraudulent activity. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts and believes that 
Fletcher, relative to a "project" in Green River, Utah. Fletcher was promoting, also 
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defrauded Jeanne C. Winder and her family out of approximately $14,000. This conduct 
may constitute but another "predicate act(s) of racketeering" on the part of Fletcher as 
contemplated in RICO. 
27. Plaintiff further asserts and believes that Defendant Fletcher is a sophisticated 
businessman who is knowledgeable about securities and brokerage affairs and who 
maintains numerous brokerage accounts. For this reason his actions are nothing less than 
intentional, let alone reckless, as contemplated in Section 61-1-22(1 )(b) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act and otherwise under federal securities and other laws. 
28. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Fletcher has engaged in similar if not identical 
"predicate acts of racketeering", namely by fraudulently obtaining lost instrument bonds on 
securities already sold or which he intends to sell and does sell in interstate commerce or 
through the mails. 
29. Plaintiff further asserts that Fletcher was acting or has acted as an investment or 
business advisor for others, including one Jeanne C. Winder, believed to be an 
unsophisticated woman. Fletcher also has never registered under the Investment Advisor's 
Act or Utah's statutory counterpart thereto. 
30. On the same day as Fletcher sold 6,000 Cardinal shares, namely 7/17/81, Fletcher 
also sold two thousand (2,000) shares of Cardinal through Potter for Winder's account and 
he, not Winder, received $560 from Potter on 7/27/81. Fletcher delivered certificate No. 
568 to Potter. On or about December 14, 1982, Fletcher, for Ms* Winder, posted an 
identical Northwestern open penalty indemnity bond on certificate No. 568, based on the 
belief that the certificate Fletcher sold, for Winder on 7/17/81, had been (like Fletcher's 
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two other certs) lost or stolen. A true and correct copy of a third bond Fletcher posted 
through Northwestern for Winder on alleged lost or stolen certificate 568 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "I" and denominated by Bond No. UMI880735. 
31. Ms. Winder was a neighbor of Fletcher and Plaintiff asserts that at all times 
Winder was acting at Fletcher's exclusive direction. Further, Fletcher was a "control 
person" of Winder as contemplated in Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 
20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 and therefore her acts are ascribable or attributable to 
Fletcher and he is thereby liable therefor. 
32. Based on Fletcher's control of Winder, Plaintiff asserts and believes that the 
activity of Winder through Fletcher is but a third "predicate act of racketeering" ascribable 
and attributable to Fletcher. Plaintiff asserts that Winder would not have sold her two 
thousand shares (2,000) and then posted an identical lost instrument bond with the very 
same bonding company used twice by Fletcher unless she was acting under his exclusive 
control, direction, and advice. 
33. On or during February, 1985, based on Winder's alleged lost certificate, Potter, 
who had purchased certificate 568 from Fletcher for Winder's account put a demand on 
Defendants Check-Rite, Atlas, and Northwestern to replace certificate No. 568 allegedly 
lost by Winder. 
34. Potter obtained a quote on two thousand (2,000) shares of Check-Rite during 
February, 1985, and Defendant Northwestern honored its obligation on the Winder bond, 
purchasing such two thousand (2,000) shares in the open market to cover its liability. 
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Thereby, Potter received two thousand (2,000) replacement shares of Check-Rite which it 
delivered to the bona fide purchaser of certificate 568. 
35. Based on the foregoing, Defendant Northwestern honored the Winder bond and 
the second bond posted by Fletcher on certificate 676 but, under absolutely identical 
circumstances, has refused to honor bond No. UMI871385 in bad faith and to the detriment 
of Plaintiff as set forth more fully hereinbelow. (See f21 hereinabove.) 
36. In May, 1988, Plaintiff submitted Cardinal certificate 258 to Atlas Stock Transfer 
to be registered in her name. Until that time Plaintiff had held such certificate in her safe 
deposit box for purposes of investment until such time as she sought to have such shares 
transferred. 
37. Atlas responded with a letter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as 
Exhibit "J" in which it refused to act on Plaintiff's lawful request. 
38. Thereafter, Atlas directed Plaintiff to resolve the dispute directly with Defendant 
Northwestern and/or Potter. 
39. Plaintiff telephoned Northwestern's local office in May 1988 and lodged her 
complaint which was ignored. 
40. Based on the non-responsiveness of Northwestern and/or Old Republic's local 
office, Plaintiff, in May 1988, subsequently telephoned such Insurance Company Defendant's 
main offices in Milwaukee, and, over the ensuing months had numerous telephone 
conversations with one Paul S. Guardalabene ("Guardalabene"), Assistant Claims Attorney 
for Defendants Northwestern and Old Republic. 
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41. Guardalabene proceeded to delay the matter by requesting voluminous and totally 
unnecessary and irrelevant documentation as to how, why, and when Plaintiff obtained the 
eight thousand (8,000) shares from KASU Securities, Inc., etc. During such telephone 
conversations of which there were several, Plaintiff continually put demand on 
Guardalabene to replace her 8,000 shares consistent with the Insurance Company 
Defendants' obligations under the open penalty bond. During this time, Guardalabene 
treated Plaintiff and gave Plaintiff the reasonable impression that she was the obligee on 
the open penalty indemnity bond and that it was appropriate for her, as opposed to Atlas 
and Check-Rite, to deal directly with the Insurance Company Defendants. 
42. Prior to July 1988, Guardalabene also had telephone discussions with Potter and 
was informed by and otherwise put on notice directly by John Potter that penny stocks such 
as Check-Rite were volatile and that therefore he (Guardalabene) ought to hurry and 
replace Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) share certificate. 
43. Regardless of such demands and warnings, Guardalabene continued to stall and 
delay Plaintiff and based on Guardalabene's dishonor of the bond posted by Fletcher, 
Plaintiff sent a letter to Guardalabene dated July 11, 1988, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit "K". Such letter evidences but further uninterrupted 
demand made by Plaintiff on the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants to replace 
Plaintiff's eight thousand (8,000) shares. 
44. Plaintiff's continued demands were refused by Defendants Atlas, Check-Rite, and 
more particularly, the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants. 
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45. On July 27, 1988. after continued irrational stalling and delay tactics on the part 
of Guardalabene. acting on behalf of the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants. Plaintiff 
wrote another letter to Guardalabene. a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "L", and which put Guardalabene on further unequivocal notice that Plaintiff not 
only demanded a replacement certificate but that Check-Rite stock had reached a price of 
one dollar per share and could continue to rise in price. 
46. After receipt of Exhibits "K" and Exhibit "L" above, the Insurance Company/Obligor 
Defendants proceeded to do nothing and otherwise redress the damages caused Plaintiff. 
47. Plaintiff asserts that on or about July 28, 1988, the price of Check-Rite Stock 
traded at $1.25 per share in Salt Lake City. This is evidenced by a letter from Bagley 
Securities, Inc., a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by 
referance as Exhibit "M". 
48. At this time Plaintiff was also in contact with one Chuck Burton, an account 
executive with Kober Financial in Denver, Colorado, a market maker in Check-Rite stock. 
49. Kober Financial informed and has informed Plaintiff that the price of Check-Rite 
stock traded as high as a $1.50 in Denver, Colorado on or after July 28, 1988. Chuck 
Burton has also telephoned Guardalabene and informed him personally of this fact. 
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50. The Defendants, knew or should have known that the price of Check-Rite stock 
would trade or could have traded as high as a $1.50 per share after May 1988, which it did. 
51. Had the Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and issuer/transfer 
agent /obligee Defendants replaced Plaintiff's eight thosuand (8,000) shares when request 
for transfer and registration was made, she could have and would have sold them at a $1.50 
per share in Denver or at least $1.25 in Salt Lake City, Utah, in July, 1988, and/or at the 
beginning of August, 1988. 
52. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Northwestern has a history and 
pattern of refusing to honor its open penalty indemnity bonds, particularly if they are in 
excess of a small amount of money, as further evidenced by a lawsuit involving Defendant 
Old Republic and filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah denominated by Civil No. 
C88-3713, assigned to the Honorable Raymond Uno. At such time that Plaintiff discovers 
additional "predicate acts" of racketeering on the part of the Insurance Company/Obligor 
Defendants, she shall seek to amend this complaint and state a cause of action against 
them under 18 U.S.C. §1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d). 
53. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite have put substantial and repeated demands on 
Northwestern and Old Republic to honor its bond, the principal of which is Scott Fletcher. 
Such demands on the part of Atlas have been refused and ignored since May, 1988. 
54. Plaintiff's counsel has further put continued and repeated demands on the 
Insurance Company/Obligor Defendants and on the issuer/transfer agent/obligee 
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Defendants to issue Plaintiff a replacement certificate or otherwise pay her damages of the 
highest price of the stock since the time Plaintiff could have sold her replacement shares 
but for Defendants' wrongful conduct. Evidence of such written formal demands include 
three (3) letters from Plaintiff's counsel directed to such Defendants dated September 21, 
1988, September 30, 1988, and November 25,1988. 
55. Such Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher have refused to make 
proper restitution to Plaintiff. 
56. Plaintiff's counsel has spent at least 25 hours negotiating in good faith with 
Defendants to make restitution to Plaintiff, such negotiations being undertaken by 
Defendants in bad faith and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees of at least 
$2,500.00, exclusive of attorney's fees paid her counsel to initiate this action. 
57. The Defendants' refusals, with the exception of the Fletcher, have further been 
asserted in bad faith for which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
58. None of the Defendants have defended the demands of Plaintiff by asserting that 
the lost instrument bond in issue was not valid or binding or that the Defendants 
Northwestern and Old Republic did not receive or accept the premium in consideration for 
its issuance. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT I 
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO TRANSFER 
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59. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
60. Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of eight thousand (8,000) shares of Cardinal 
(Check-Rite) as fully comtemplated in I70A-8-401 and 405(3) Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code, Investment Securities. 
61. Plaintiff had no knowledge of Defendant Fletcher's fraud nor did she know or had 
she ever heard of Fletcher at the time of her acquisition of such shares or otherwise until 
May, 1988. 
62. Plaintiff, as a purchaser, had no notice of any adverse claims as contemplated in 
§70A-8-304, Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("U.U.C.C."). 
63. In May, 1988, Plaintiff presented certificate 258 to Defendant Atlas Stock Transfer 
and lawfully requested transfer in accordance with I70A-8-306, U.U.C.C. 
64. Certificate 258 was properly endorsed as fully contemplated in Article 8, U.U.C.C. 
65. Plaintiff had no duty of inquiry into the problems posed by Defendant Fletcher's 
wrongful and fraudulent conduct. 
66. Plaintiff had no obligation to register her transfer until such time until she sought 
to do so. 
67. Plaintiff's right to registration was not affected by Fletcher's indorsement as such 
did not give notice of any adverse claims. (See Section 70A-8-3J0, U.U.C.C.) 
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68. Assuming Fletcher's indorsement on certificate 258 was unauthorized, which it 
was not, such was ratified by Fletcher's sale of certificate 258 through Potter in July 1981 
and his receipt of valuable consideration for such sale. (See Section 70A-8-311. U.U.C.C.) 
69. Plaintiff was a purchaser of certificate 258 for value and without notice of any 
adverse claims. 
70. At the time of Plaintiff's purchase or assignment, she could not have known of any 
adverse claims as Fletcher waited one (1) year after he sold it before fraudulently claiming 
certificate 258 was lost or stolen. 
71. A bona fide purchaser is entitled to transfer and registration without 
unreasonable delay as provided in §70A-8-401 and 405(3) U.U.C.C. 
72. Defendant Atlas and Check-Rite should have transferred and registered Plaintiff's 
eight thousand (8,000) shares in May, 1988 when so presented. 
73. Such Defendants' abject failure to do so has damaged Plaintiff in that she was 
unable to sell such eight thousand (8,000) shares in July or August. 1988. when Check-Rite 
stock reached a price of a $1.50 per share. 
74. Had Plaintiff obtained replacement shares in May 1988, she would have 
subsequently sold such shares and obtained approximately $12,000. 
75. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth 
below. 
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COUNT II 
CONVERSION 
76. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
77. Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite received delivery and possession of certificate 
258, Plaintiff's certificate representing the eight thousand (8,000) shares, in May, 1988. 
78. Such Defendants have interfered with Plaintiff's right to control and possess eight 
thousand (8,000) shares of Check-Rite since May, 1988. 
79. Such wrongful interference has been intentional and has caused Plaintiff great 
expense, inconvenience, and damage. 
80. Such Defendants have effectively converted eight thousand (8,000) shares of 
Check-Rite belonging to Plaintiff to their own use. 
81. Such possession of certificate 258 by such Defendants since May, 1988 is 
inconsistent with Plaintiff's right of control and ownership thereof. 
82. Such Defendants have virtually done nothing to remedy the dispute which, prior to 
filing this complaint, has caused Plaintiff to incur attorney's fees of approximately $2,500. 
83. A mistake of law or fact is not a defense to such Defendants' conversion. 
84. Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite as set forth 
below. 
COUNT III 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
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85. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
86. The relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendants, with the exception of 
Defendant Fletcher (with whom Plaintiff was not privity), required such Defendants to deal 
fairly with Plaintiff and otherwise act in good faith. 
87. Such an obligation was a covenant that such Defendants each and all have 
breached. 
88. Utah law recognizes such a cause of action and further that punitive damages are 
available hereunder. 
89. Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Fletcher, are liable to Plaintiff for 
their breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which has damaged 
Plaintiff damage as set forth below. 
COUNT IV 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS 
90. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
91. Defendant Insurance Companies entered into an agreement whereby they agreed 
to indemnify Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite from any loss caused by the resurfacing of 
Check-Rite certificate 258. 
92. The Insurance Company Defendants have breached such agreement by failing to 
honor the bond issued by them. 
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93. Such breach of contract on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants has 
caused Plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser of certificate 258. substantial damage and injury in 
that Plaintiff has not been able to seek restitution from Atlas and Check-Rite until such 
bond was honored by the Insurance Company Defendants. 
94. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse or defense for their failure to 
honor the bond issued by them and they have maliciously lulled Plaintiff into the belief that 
she was an obligee on the bond. 
95. Based on the Insurance Company Defendants' breach of contract which they knew 
and had reason to know would damage Plaintiff or a person similarly situated, such 
Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for all damages as a result of such breach as set forth 
below. 
COUNT V 
BAD FAITH REFUSAL ON THE PART OF THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANTS 
96. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
97. The Insurance Company Defendants have no excuse for their failure to honor 
bond No. UMI871385. 
98. Such Defendants have had since early May, 1988. to honor the bond issued by 
them. 
99. Such Defendants acted negligently or otherwise intentionally in refusing to honor 
their bond obligation and otherwise remedy Plaintiff's damages immediately and reasonably. 
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100. Such Defendants have not acted reasonably and have acted in bad faith by 
innundating Plaintiff with false excuses for their failure to honor such bond and their legal 
commitment with respect thereto. Such excuses include but are not limited to (1) 
unreasonably demanding numerous documentation from Plaintiff that she was the lawful 
successor-in-interest of KASU Securities, Inc., (when Atlas had no dispute with such), (2) 
informing Plaintiff that they were in fact investigating the matter when they were not, (3) 
stalling several months and thereafter contending that the indorsement on certificate 258 
was a forgery, and (4) ultimately informing Plaintiff that she had to deal with Atlas while all 
along leading her to believe that she should deal directly with the Insurance Company 
Defendants. 
101. Plaintiff believes and asserts that the Insurance Company Defendants have 
refused to honor other bonds of a similar nature over the last ten (10) years, bonds in 
particular in which such Defendants' liability exceeds at least five hundred dollars ($500.00). 
102. On the other hand, the Insurance Company Defendants have singled Plaintiff out 
and not honored the bond covering her certificate while honoring the two other Fletcher 
bonds detailed hereinabove. 
103. Such bad faith refusal on the part of the Insurance Company Defendants is so 
outrageous under the circumstances that Plaintiff is entitled to substantial punitive and 
exemplary damages to deter such wrongful and malicious conduct in the future as set forth 
below. 
COUNT VI 
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AIDING AND ABETTING 
104. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
105. The Insurance Company Defendants knew or should have known that they were 
putting Defendant Fletcher in a position where he could take advantage of and defraud 
others as further set forth elsewhere herein. 
106. The Insurance Company Defendants did not investigate Defendant Fletcher 
reasonably, if at all. Had they done so. they would have either have not issued any bonds or, 
they would have immediately paid for a replacement certificate in May, 1988. 
107. The Insurance Company Defendants should have known better than to rely on 
the false and fraudulent affidavits of Fletcher in issuing open penalty indemnity bonds for 
his benefit. 
108. The Insurance Company Defendants have issued at least three (3) bonds which 
have benefited Fletcher, solely with regard to Check-Rite stock alone and may have issued 
other bonds in his favor with regard to the securities of other issuers. 
109. But for the substantial assistance and aiding and abetting on the part of the 
Insurance Company Defendants, Fletcher would not have been able to fraudulently obtain 
an additional sixteen thousand (16,000) shares of Check-Rite which he did in fact obtain 
fraudulently and is believed to have thereafter sold in interstate pommerce. But for the 
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Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting and their subsequent bad faith refusals 
which have further aided and abetted Fletcher, Plaintiff would not have been damaged. 
110. But for the substantial assistance of the Insurance Company Defendants, 
Fletcher would not of have been able to commit his frauds and racketeering as set forth 
below. 
111. The Insurance Company Defendants' aiding and abetting of Fletcher has 
proximately caused Plaintiff damages as set forth below. 
COUNT VII 
NEGLIGENCE 
112. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
113. Each and all of the Defendants owed Plaintiff the duty to prevent those damages 
of which she has been caused. 
114. Each Defendant breached that duty under their respective circumstances which 
has been the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages. 
115. Reasonable persons in the same position of each of the Defendants would not 
have acted in the manner that each Defendant has in fact acted. 
116. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages against each of the 
Defendants for their individual and joint and several negligence \j/hich, under the 
circumstances, has exceeded all bounds of reasonableness and for which such additional 
damages are justified as set forth below. 
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COUNT VIII 
VIOLATION OF §12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT 
OF 1933 BY DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
117. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
118. Defendant Fletcher sold a security by the use or the means of an instrument of 
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of an oral communication, which included an 
untrue statement of a material fact or which omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make his statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading. 
119. Defendant Fletcher, when he sold certificate 258 representing eight thousand 
(8,000) shares, omitted to state that he would subsequently declare such certificate lost or 
stolen, that he would execute a false affidavit under oath to that effect, obtain a bond, 
receive an additional eight thousand (8,000) shares to which he was not entitled and 
otherwise put Plaintiff or someone like her in her present position. 
120. Plaintiff did not know and there is no way or means by which she could have 
known of Fletcher's untruths or omissions when she obtained delivery of cerf iticate 258 
from Potter. 
121. Defendant Fletcher cannot sustain the burden that he did not know and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of his untruths or omissions. 
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122. Defendant Fletcher is the proximate cause, culpable participant, significant 
factor, or proximate cause of the damages inflicted on Plaintiff and under §12(2) case law 
Plaintiff need not be in direct privity with him to recover damages hereunder. Plaintiff thus 
prays for damages against Fletcher as set forth below. 
COUNT IX 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 61-1-22(1 )(b) OF 
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT ON THE PART OF 
DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
123. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
124. This count is the Utah statutory conterpart to Section 12(2) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, Plaintiff's preceding cause of action. 
125. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees hereunder. 
126. Plaintiff is entitled to 12% interest from the date of payment for the stock 
subject to this dispute. 
127. Plaintiff did not discover Defendant Fletcher's violation hereunder until May, 
1988. 
128. Defendant Fletcher's violation of this statute is reckless or intentional for which 
Plaintiff is entitled to damages of three times the consideration paid for the security with 
interest thereon at the rate of 12% as set forth below. 
COUNT X 
COMMON LAW FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
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129. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
130. Defendant Fletcher engaged in a plan or scheme to defraud and injure Plaintiff or 
someone like her which has caused her and those similarly situated substantial injury and 
damage. 
131. Defendant Fletcher, by selling certificate 258 through Potter Investment 
Company, impliedly represented that he would not subsequently encumber such certificate, 
knowing his representations as set forth hereinabove were false and that Plaintiff's problem 
which has been created by him would eventually occur. 
132. The representations made by Fletcher as per certificate No. 258 itself through 
Potter and in turn to Plaintiff were false. 
133. The false representations made by Defendant Fletcher concerned past or 
present facts. 
134. The past or present facts about which Defendant Fletcher made fale 
misrepresentations were material. 
135. The material, false representations made by Defendant Fletcher about past or 
present facts were susceptible of knowledge by him. 
136. Defendant Fletcher who so represented, knew that that which is alleged herein 
was false or in the alternative, asserted such false representations as of his own knowledge 
without knowing or discerning if such was true or false. 
137. Defendant Fletcher intended that a customer of Potter be induced to act, or in 
misleading a customer of Potter such as Plaintiff into thinking that she or someone like her 
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was justified in purchasing the subject security and thereby relying on Fletcher's 
misrepresentations and omissions. 
138. A customer of Potter namely Plaintiff, was in fact induced to act or was justified 
or reasonable under the circumstances in acting on Defendant Fletcher's false and 
fraudulent representations and omissions either impliedly or directly as per certificate 258 
on its face. 
139. Plaintiff's purchase of the securities was in reliance on the representations of 
Fletcher as he had endorsed certificate 258 and such was properly signatured guaranteed, 
creating the undeniable impression that it was a negotiable instrument. 
140. Plaintiff has suffered damages which are attributable to the misrepresentations 
of Defendant Fletcher, based on his false and fraudulent representations or statements, 
including his affidavit, which are the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury and 
damage. 
141. Defendant Fletcher's scheme or artifice to defraud a customer of Potter, which 
has occurred on at least three occasions with the same security and with the same 
Insurance Company Defendants, is malicious and harmful to the free enterprise system, 
interstate commerce, and the securities industry as a whole, and entitles Plaintiff to 
substantial punitive and exemplary damages to deter fraudulent schemes of this nature in 
which is a sophisticated Defendant such as Fletcher takes advantage of and defrauds an 
individual such as Plaintiff out of substantial funds. 
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142. Defendant Fletcher has engaged in such a plan scheme or artifice to defraud 
other individuals such as Plaintiff for the same purposes and under the same pretenses with 
regard to the same security in issue and also with regard to the securities of other issuers. 
In this regard, as set forth above, he is believed to have been the subject of a criminal 
investigation. 
143. Plaintiff had no avenue or reasonable means of knowing or discovering that 
Fletcher's express and implied representations were false and fraudulent as Plaintiff was 
not apprised of what Fletcher would subsequently do. 
144. Fletcher's scheme or plan or artifice to defraud Plaintiff and someone like her 
was designed to harm and injure her and those similarly situated. 
145. The representations and/or omissions of Fletcher were false or fraudulent and 
when made were then and there known by Fletcher to be false and fraudulent and his 
misrepresentations were matters of material fact inducing Plaintiff's purchase of the 
securities. 
146. Said misrepresentations and omissions of Fletcher were made knowingly and 
intentionally or with the reckless or holding negligent and wanton disregard for the truth for 
the express purpose of obtaining additional stock for which Fletcher was not entitled and 
thereby creating Plaintiff's present situation. 
147. Defendant Fletcher had a duty not to make such representations to Plaintiff 
through Potter and had a duty to disclose facts and circumstances which he abjectly failed 
to disclose to Plaintiff through Potter. 
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148. As a direct and proximate result of Fletcher's breaches of duty owed Plaintiff 
and some one like her. Plaintiff has been substantially damaged and is entitled to have and 
recover against Fletcher, in addition to actual damages, punitive and exemplary damages in 
the amount of at least two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00). 
COUNT XI 
VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND 
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO") 
ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT FLETCHER 
149. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation elsewhere herein as if each were 
set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
150. This court has jurisdiction over violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act. 
151. Defendant Fletcher is believed to have engaged in racketeering activity within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) including, but not limited to the following indictable offenses: 
(a) the transmission by such Defendant, by means of wire communication in interstate 
commerce, of writings, signals or sounds for the purpose of executing his scheme or 
artifice to defraud Plaintiff and other investors similarly situated in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§1343; 
(b) the use of the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 to consummate this and/or a 
similar scheme; 
(c) fraud in the sale of securities; and/or 
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(d) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under Title 11 U.S.C., namely 
bankruptcy fraud. 
152. The conduct of Defendant Fletcher as alleged herein constitutes a pattern of 
racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(5) insofar as Defendant Fletcher 
engaged in at least two acts of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§1961(1) within the last ten (10) years. 
153. Defendant Fletcher has received income derived, directly or indirectly, from a 
pattern of rackeetering activity and/or has used or invested, directly or indirectly, part of 
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of an interest in, and/or in 
the establishment or operation of, an enterprise or enterprises which is or are engaged in, 
or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(a). 
154. Defendant Fletcher has, through a pattern of racketeering activity, acquired and 
maintained, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise or enterprises 
which is or are engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate of foreign commerce 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(b). 
155. Defendant Fletcher has, while employed by or associated with an enterprise, 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate commerce, conducted or 
participated, directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprisers') affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(q}. 
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156. Defendant Fletcher has conspired with another (which may include the Insurance 
Company Defendants) to violate the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b). and (c) in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). 
157. Plaintiff believes and asserts that Defendant Fletcher is a "person" and/or an 
"enterprise" as the case may be as necessary to satisfy the technical pleading requirement 
under the statute, particularly §1962(c), regarding such distinctions and Plaintiff asserts 
that she presently lacks sufficient information to presently make a more particularized 
distinction. 
158. Defendant Fletcher aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, 
or willfully caused the commission of the racketeering activities, regardless of the 
capacities in which he acted, and therefore, is liable as a principal in and to said activity 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2. 
159. Plaintiff has been injured in her business or property as a direct and proximate 
result of Defendant Fletcher's violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962 in an amount in excess of 
$40,000.00. the precise amount of which damages is not yet ascertained, but which will be 
established at trial. 
160. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from and against 
Defendant Fletcher threefold the amount of the damages sustained by Plaintiff, in an 
amount believed to be in excess of $40,000.00. to be proven on or before trial, plus the cost 
of this suit, interest, and resonable attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, on all of Plaintiff's causes of action, Plaintiff prays for trial by jury; 
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1. On Counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants Atlas and Check-Rite in the amount of the highest price of the stock since May, 
1988, an amount to be proven on or before trial and which Plaintiff calculates to be at least 
$12,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's 
fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
2. On Count III of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against all 
Defendants with the exception of Defendant Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000 to 
be proven on or before trial, punitive damages of several thousand dollars, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
3. On Count IV of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of the highest price that Check-Rite stock 
has attained since May, 1988, which Plaintiff calculates to be at least $12,000.00, for costs, 
pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
4. On Count V of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in the amount of at least $12,000 to be proven on or before 
trial, for punitive damages of at least $200,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment 
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interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
5. On Count VI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Insurance Company Defendants in amount to be determined on or before trial, for punitive 
damages of at least $50,000.00, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest 
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, 
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
6. On Count VII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants jointly and severally in an amount to be proven on or before trial, but which 
includes all of the attorney's fees that Plaintiff has incurred in attempting to settle the 
matter without litigation, for substantial punitive and exemplary damages as against all 
Defendants jointly and severally, for costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest 
legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, 
and for any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
7. On Count VIII of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendant Fletcher in an amount of her damages which Plaintiff believes to be at least 
$12,000 and which further includes her needless incurring of substantial attorney's fees to 
date, costs, pre and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in 
accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
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8. On Count IX of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Fletcher in the amount of three times the consideration paid for the security, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at 12% per annum since September 1981, attorney's fees in 
accordance with §78-27-56 and §61-1-22(1), Utah Code Ann., and for any and all further 
relief as the court deems fair and equitable; 
9. On Count X of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Fletcher in the amount of at least $12,000.00, including all attorney's fees that Plaintiff has 
needlessly been required to incur, punitive damages of at least $250,000.00, for costs, pre 
and post-judgment interest at the highest legal rate, attorney's fees in accordance with 
§78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., and otherwise, and for any and all further relief as the court 
deems fair and equitable; 
10. On Count XI of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendant Fletcher for violation of any one of 18 U.S.C. §§1962(a),(b),(c), and/or (d) of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in an amount of at least $40,000.00, 
for costs, reasonable attorney's fees as provided therein, pre and post-judgment interest 
at the highest legal rate, and any and all further relief as the court deems fair and equitable. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 1989. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
B o n d N o . UMI 8 7 1 3 8 5 
Snoiu all Btcu by lljesc Presents, THAT S c o t t J- Fletcher 
is Principal and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
exiting ujidtr the laws of the Slate of Wisconsin duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and surety-
ship in the State of and having an office and principal place of business in said Slate 
a t D25 E 4500 S, S a l t Lake Ci ty , Ut^  M S u r e t y (hereinafter collectively calkd the Obligors'), 
are held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy Corporation 
and 
Atlas Stock Transfer 
and unto ail such individuals, firms and corporations, as mny now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
and/or Registrar(s) of the below mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the * Obligees'), in an amount, pay. 
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set forth not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid lo the Obligees, and etch of them, and 
to their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear, for which payment well and 
rul) lo be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors assigns, heirs and legal reprcscnta 
tnes jointly and severally, firmly by these presents 
SLALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in O^E counterparts, this ^ 3 r d ^ 
OJ August 19 8 2 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Cerlificate(s) No (s) ^ 5 8 
representing 8.,000 shares of Cardinal Energy Corporation stock issued 
June 17, 1981. 
registered in the name of * ^ „ S c o t t _ J , F l e t c h e r 0<2> 5 9 1 0 
(hereinafter called "old certificate(s)"} ; that the old certificate(s) ha s been lost, de»lroved or stolen so that the 
s«me cannot be found or produced, and that said Principal has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans 
fcr/ed the old ccrtificale(s), or the shares represented thereb), or an) interest therein or right thereto 
WHFREAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
issue and deliver a new certincate(s) in the place and stead of the old certificatc(s), upon the execution and delivery 
o» this bond, 
NOW, THERFFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at all times indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives, 
successors and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and from 
ind^  again«t any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities whatsoever, 
wh*.h the Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, at on) time shall 
orfraay sustain or incur (1) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new ccrtificate(s), or (2) bv reason of any 
claun which may be made in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or 
otrur act v*h»ch said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may 
Loake or do in respect of the old certificate(a), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
t tade or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other 
act, or (4) by reason of any other matter or ihing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors, 
then this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect 
Trie Surely agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here 
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence 
o< interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It u underrtood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be atfectc 1 by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar. 
Scott J. Fletcher 
NotTHWiffrnN NATIONAL INSUI 
- ( L 8 ) 
iF«* 
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AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
:OUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas J, Brough, being first duly sworn, on oath desposes and says 
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the 
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute 
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah 
in referenced to becoming sole Surety upon bond, undertakings and 
obligations* 
Thomas J. Br<Magh / 
Attorney-in-Fact 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd Day of August, 1982 
My Commission Expires.^ MyAmissionCxpl^ AprlllS. 1984 
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V)7M NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
B o n d N o . UMI 9 0 2 1 6 8 ' 
&uoiu oil illett by lljcse presents, THAT S c o t t J- Fletcher 
as Principal and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY a corporation org-uw H nivl 
existing under the Laws of the State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of jrdcmnjty an J surety 
ship in the State of . U t a h ^ j having an office and principal place of business in said State 
at 5 2 5 E 4 5 0 0 S , S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t as Surety (hereinafter collectively called the* Obligors'), 
aie tuld and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy 
and 
Atlas Stock Transfer 
and ui»(o all such individuals, firms and corporations, at may now ond/or hucafter be a< tinj as Irunsfer Agcnt(a) 
and/or Ktgistrar(s) of the below mentioned stock, (hereinafter collectively tailed the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legall) assumed b) the burety 
under an> law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid lo the Obligees, and each of diem, and 
to their respective legal representative*, successors and assigns, as interest may appear, for which pa)ineut well and 
trul) to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tive*, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents 
SCAl LD with the seals of the Obligors and executed in 7WQ counterparts, tins 2 3*"d day 
of November
 19 83 jr \^% 
WULKEAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No (s) 6 7 6 
r ep resen t ing 8,000 shares of Cardinal Energy stock issued August 2 3. 1982 
regislcied in tho name of S C O t t J . F l e t C O ^ r , 
(hereinafter called "old certificate^)") , that the old certifieale(s) ha S. been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the 
»ame cunnol be found or produced, and that said Principal ban not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans 
ferred the old ccrlihcale(s), or the shares represented thereb), or any interest llierei'i or r»clit dicreto 
W Hr 11 LAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
issue and drliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old ccrlincatc(s), upon the execution and delivery 
of this bond, 
NOW, IHCKErOflE, the condition of this obligation is suih that, if the Principal shall at all times indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representative*, 
successor* and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or otheiwtsc, und from 
an J i^unst in) otul all losses, damages, costs, churgea coiinst 1 fees, pa) incuts, expenses and liabilities whatsoever, 
which tiic Obligees, or any of them, or their icspedive hgal rt prescnUlives, successors or assigns, at an> tune shall 
or nn\ sustain or IIM ur (1) bv reason of said issue and delivcn of such urw rcrlificate(s) or (°» bv r< is« n f^ any 
chiiu winch ma) be made in respect of the old certificates), or (J) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange or 
other act whuh said Obligees, or an) of them, or their respective lrgal representatives, *ucrc<sois or assigns, may 
make or do in respect of the old ccrtificatc(s), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
made or dune upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such pa) mini, transfer, exchange or other 
v l >r ( t; Lyr« «.on «»f uny »»ih« r in atcr or tiling ari»»ng out of ''it rcrc in ion <>{ die -loi* t- d IC.JL* -.1 uf tlic Ol '.goi*, 
then this obh0ation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and ctlcct 
The Surtt) a^rrcs that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here* 
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure to execute, this bond, or any absence 
of interest of the Pnncipal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It is untieistood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Tiansfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be affected by the termination of the agency of such Tronsfer Agent ©rjtegislrar 
I I 
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Ti)0 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Thomas J. Brough, being first duly sworn, on oath desposes and says 
that he is the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT of the NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver the 
foregoing obligations; that said company is authorized to execute 
the same and has complied in all respects with the laws of Utah 
in referenced to becominq sole Surety upon bondf undertakings and 
obligations. 
Thonfas J. Brou 
Attorney-in-Fadt 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd Day of November, 19 8 3 
My Commission Expires: 
,£)tAsn,fr££/ 
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UoiuJ (or IXJHI hvstruii»cul — O^ieo Penally 
NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
off Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
B o n d N o . UMI 8 8 0 7 3 5 
$tU0lD a l l BleU l>{| UjC0C l)rC0Clll0, THAT Jeannejinder 
as Principal, and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL I N S U R A N C E COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of trie State of Wisconsin, duly authorized to transact the business of indemnity and surety-
ship in the State of „....?.. and having an office and principal place of business in said State 
at 5 2 5 E 4 5 °.° . : S / . ? a \ L ^ * \ ? - . . CA^I L. Vt as Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"), 
are held and firmly bound unto 
C a r d i n a l Energy 
and unto all such individual?, firms and corporations, as may now and/or hereafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
und/or Registrar (s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set fordi, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surety 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and 
to their respective legal representative*, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, 
, ONE 1 4 t h SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in counterparts, this day 
, December ,^ 82 
of , 19 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s) 
representing 2,000 shares of Cardinal Enerav stock 
* v i x N 
It 11111 • I I 
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OTTOO 
existing ^nacr^huTiaws ol t i i e^Skne^PWl^ .aeaa'bfinaemiiuy anu &uieiy-
ship in the State of U t a h
 a n ( j j ^ y ^ g a n office a n c ] principal place of business in said State 
a t 525 E 4500 S, S a l t Lake Ci ty , Ut a 8 Surety (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligors"), 
are held and firmly bound unto 
Cardinal Energy 
and unto all such individuals, firms a**d corporations, as may now and/or heicafter be acting as Transfer Agent(s) 
and/or Regibtrar(s) of the below-mentioned stock (hereinafter collectively called the "Obligees"), in an amount, pay-
able in lawful money of the United States, sufficient to indemnify the Obligees under the condition of this bond as 
hereinafter set forth, not to exceed, however, the maximum amount of risk which may be legally assumed by the Surely 
under any law governing the validity or performance of this bond, to be paid to the Obligees, and each of them, and 
to iheir respective legal representatives, successors and assigns, as interest may appear; for which payment well and 
truly to be made, the Obligors do bind themselves, and their respective successors, assigns, heirs and legal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
ONE . 1 4 t h SEALED with the seals of the Obligors and executed in counterparts, this day 
of December ., 19. 82 
WHEREAS, the Principal represents that said Principal is the owner of Certificate(s) No.(s) . 
r e p r e s e n t i n q 2 #000 s h a r e s of C a r d i n a l Eneray s t o c k 
568 
* v ^ V 
registered in the name of -. £ ? E ? l » i ^ e I 
(hereinafter called "old certificate(s)"); that the old ccrtificate(s) ha been lost, destroyed or stolen so that the 
j-.ime cannot be found or produced; and that said Princip.il has not sold, pledged, hypothecated or otherwise trans-
ferred the old ccrlificalc(s), or the shares represented thereby, or any interest therein or right thereto. 
W11EHEAS, the Obligees, in reliance upon said representations and at the request of the Obligors, arc willing to 
issue and deliver a new certificate(s) in the place and stead of the old certificate(s), upon the execution and delivery 
of this bond; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall at nil times indemnify 
and keep indemnified and save harmless the Obligees, and each of them, and their respective legal representatives, 
surr<->sors and assigns, from and against any and all actions and suits, whether groundless or othciwise, and from 
and against any and all losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees, payments, expenses and liabilities vthaUocver, 
which the Obligees, or any of themK or their ies[>ective legal representatives, successors or assign*, at any time shall 
or may sustain or incur (1) by reason of said issue and delivery of such new certificate(s), or (2) by reason of any 
claim uhiih may be mad*! in respect of the old certificate(s), or (3) by reason of any payment, transfer, exchange 4M* 
other act which said Obligees, or any of them, or their respective legal representatives, successors or assigns, may 
make or do in respect of the old certificate^), whether made or done through accident, oversight, or neglect, or whether 
made or done upon presentation thereof without contesting the propriety of such payment, transfer, exchange or other 
act, or (4) by reason of any other matter or thing arising out of the recognition of the aforesaid request of the Obligors, 
then this obligation shall be void; odierwise it shall remain in full force and effect. 
The Surety agrees that its liability hereunder shall be absolute, regardless of any liability of the Principal here-
under, whether by reason of any irregular or unauthorized execution of, or failure lo execute, this bond, or any absence 
of interest of the Principal in the subject matter hereof, or otherwise. 
It is understood that the obligation hereby created in favor of any such Transfer Agent or Registrar shall not 
be affected by the termination of the agency of such Transfer Agent or Registrar. 
^^^s^ctc^TS s2- /<s-*\2. a< J e a n n e w) 
NOBTIIWECTbftN 
-s r>^e>o. A -sr c/?~? 
'A,t£k<&&u^ (L.S.) 
"
r>dfr r\ 
l)lONAL iNSUItANCt: CoMtyAJSY, 
> * ^ t tJtA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER 
C O R P O R A T I O N 
May 4, 1988 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
RE: Checkrite International 
Dear Ms. Broadwater: 
Enclosed please find a photocopy of Cardinal 
Energy Corporation certificate number SL-0000258 
for 8,000 shares registered in the name of Scott 
J. Fletcher. 
This certificate was reported lost and in 
lieu of which a new security was issued unde^r 
a bond of indemnity dated Aug. 23, 1982. There-
fore, we must refuse your request for registration, 
and propose to retain and cancel this certificate. 
Very truly yours, 
Franklin L. Kimball 
Transfer Agent 
FLK:pg 
Enclosures it 
EXHIBIT j 
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July 11, 1988 
Mr. Paul S. Guardatabene 
Old Republic Insurance Co. 
P. 0. Box 1635 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 
Dear Mr. Guardatabene: 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of last week, this 
letter will confirm my purchase of 8,000 shares of Check 
Rite International (formerly Cardinal Energy) from Potter 
Investment Company, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 21
 f 
1981. The certificate which was delivered to me by 
Potter Investment Company was #258, in the name of Scott 
J. Fletcher, 9916 Petunia V7ay, Sandy, Utah 84092. The 
amount I paid for the stock at that time was $.31. 
As I indicated to you on the phone, I purchased this stock 
in good faith from Potter Investment Company for investment 
purposes, and I will in no way accept what you proposed as 
far as settling with me for my original purchase price. 
After further consideration, I feel that it would be in 
everyone's best interests to simply replace the stock so 
that I will be free to sell it whenever I choose. The 
market seems to be firming up on said stock, so Sotfee^ uentl 
this matter should be resolved as quickly as possible. 
I look forward to hearing from you in the very near future. 
Sincerely, 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Phone: (801) 277-3068 
lb 
EXHIBIT 
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f;TT;)0 
July 27, 1983 
Mr. Paul S. Guardalabene 
Old PepublicSSurety Company 
P. 0. Eox 1635 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 
Dear Mr. Guardalabene: 
Regarding our telephone conversation of today, enclosed 
please find documents which should clarify my position 
and status with KASU Securities, Inc. and the fact that 
I am the legal owner of the 8,000 shares of Check-Rite 
International (formerly Cardinal Energy). 
I have high-lighted the pertinent information on enclosed 
documents for your convenience. 
As I stated to you today, the subject stock is now trading 
at $1*00 and could continue to go much higher. 
I will be waiting to hear from you soon. 
Sincerely, 
LeAnna Broadwater 
3576 Oak Rim Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Phone: (801) 277-3068 
lb 
end. 
EXHIBIT *T 
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T-TTOO 
"1 B A G LEY 
J SECURITIES, INC. 
Monfvr SASD* SUV 
Mr. J. Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
November 25, 1988 
Dear Mr. Coombs: 
This letter is in response to your inquiring today 
regarding the market action of CHECK RITE INTERNATIONAL 
formerly Cardinal Energy. 
Our firm is a primary market maker and has provided 
a continuous quotation for this stock to the investment 
community and the National Quotation Bureau. In 
researching our records, I find that CHECKRITE INTER-
NATIONAL had a high trade of $1.25 per share on July 
28, 1988. 
Sijxe^f^l; 
EM/ka 
EXHIBIT. "/r 
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Third Jui -uioiiuict 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f/k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. : 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNEST MUTH 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Ernest Muth on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant is a stock broker employed by Bagley Securities. Inc., and 
for several years he has been a registered representative with the National Association of 
ftb1 0 b IS$Q 
Deputy Cterk 
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Securities Dealers, Inc., fNASD") and the Utah Securities Division. That he has personal 
knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. 
2. That your affiant's firm, Bagley Securities, Inc.. undertook transactions in 
the securities of Check-Rite fromjrfsty through August, 1988. That based on official 
records in the possession of Bagley Securities which your affiant has examined, the 
following is a list of the highest prices that the stock of Check-Rite was either bought or 
sold by Bagley Securities for the period(s) so indicated: 
MAY. 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
JUNE, 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
HIGHEST 
* P R I C E _ 
jtlL 
.-bo 
jJLo. 
JULY. 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
$1.25 
AUGUST. 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
- 2 -
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THIRD WEEK: tOo^^M^*? 
FOURTH WEEK: Do TEM>C<T 
3. To your affiant's best knowledge and belief, the highest price that the stock 
traded in Salt Lake City in 1988 was $1.25 per share as evidenced by Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference, a true and correct copy of a Bagley Securities stock 
confirmation. 
4. That Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater has a brokerage account with your affiant 
and during the latter part of July and the beginning of August. 1988. your affiant was in 
regular communication with her about the price of Check Rite stock. That your affiant 
believes and is informed that if Ms. Broadwater had had a certificate of Check Rite to 
deliver, she would have sold it during the end of July or early August. 1988 when the price of 
the Company's stock achieved its highest price in 1988. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
'SE-
DATED this*Z.\ day of January. 1990 
Ernest/vluth x 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before Me 
?t&ry Kibiic siding at Salt Lake City. UT 
My commission txpires: 
AFDVT.3 
- 3 -
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
«"• * \ * n F 
IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T IN A N D FOR 
SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHUCK BURTON 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF COLO. 
COUNTY OF 
)ss. 
Chuck Burton, on his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein. 
That during July and August 1988 your affiant was employed as an account executive with 
•KoVw ifiiiTBHKHtri, a securities broker-dealer in Denver, Colorado. 
tUj 
- 1 -
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2. That during the time your affiant was an account executive with-£ebef- L^?urfc (e$\ 
FwanotQl, it made a "market" in the stock of Check Rite International, Inc. v — y 
3. That your affiant recalls a conversation he had with Plaintiff LeAnna 
Broadwater some time in July 1988 in which she sought a quote on the stock of Check Rite. 
4. That your affiant specifically recalls a transaction at Kuber Financial in fc iyf. 
which a sale of Check Rite stock occurred at $1 3/8 per share, exclusive of commissions. 
5. That your affiant blieves and recalls that such transaction occurred at July 
1988 end or early August 1988 and such was soon after your affiant's telephone 
conversation with Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this (8_day of .Aa§t»t. 1989. 
uck Burton \ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisi8th day of /%u§tts% 1989. 
3rf Notary Public 
Residing at Denver, Colorado 
My Commission Expires: <$T/m£ <5? CobuAsfaj 
- 2 -
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 - - , / . ,«»« 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF POTTER 
INVESTMENT COMPANY 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
George "John" Potter, being first put on his oath deposes and says as follows 
on behalf of Potter Investment Company: 
1. That your affiant is a principal of the securities brokerage firm here in Salt 
Lake City known as Potter Investment Company. That your affiant has power and authority 
- 1 -
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to make this affidavit on behalf of Potter Investment Company. That since the 1950's your 
affiant has been in the securities brokerage business and he has been a registered 
representative with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") and the 
Utah Securities Division. That he has personal knowledge and experience as to that which is 
contained herein. 
2. That Potter Investment Company bought certificate 258 from defendant 
Scott J. Fletcher and sold the same to plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. That such certificate 
was properly endorsed by Fletcher and properly signature guaranteed as required in the 
industry. In the industry such a certificate is known as "street stock" and it was delivered to 
and accepted by plaintiff Broadwater on the settlement date of her purchase transaction 
with Potter Investment Company. That because Potter Investment Company received 
valuable consideration from Ms. Broadwater for her purchase of 8,000 shares of Check 
Rite, Potter Investment Company has and would have had no dispute as to whether Ms. 
Broadwater then became the true and lawful owner of certificate 258. 
3. That sometime in mid-1988, Potter Investment Company learned about 
plaintiff's problem with respect to her request of Atlas Stock Transfer, Check Rite's 
transfer agent, to transfer and register Check Rite certificate 258 into her name. 
4. That sometime in the end of June or the first week of July 1988 your affiant 
recalls engaging in a telephone conversation with an individual who identified himself as 
Paul S. Guardalabene and who further identified himself as an employee or agent of Old 
Republic Surety, the insurance company that had written a lost instrument bond on Check 
Rite certificate 258. That your affiant had a lengthy discussion with Mr. Guardalabene 
about penny stocks and lost instrument bonds, etc., one that lasted probably at least 30 
- 2 -
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minutes or more. That during such conversation with Mr. Guardalabene, your affiant 
informed Mr. Guardalabene that penny stocks such as Check Rite were highly volatile and it 
was your affiant's suggestion to Mr. Guardalabene that it would be in Guardalabene's best 
interest to quickly resolve any dispute with plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater as the stock could 
appreciate in value. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this /1 day of February, 1990. 
/ I V / ^ p 4 
George "Jbhnf Patter 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
AFDVT.! 
- 3 -
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF 
PENNY G. GRACE 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Attached hereto in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint is the Affidavit of Penny G. Grace, Assistant Vice 
President of Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. 
M 
'fifi 
^— in* 
- 1 -
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THOMSON 
/VfWN^ON / fWNN NSECURfllESINC 
333 CHESTERFIELD CENTER BLDG., SUITE 100, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI 63017 314 532-2400 
August 8, 1989 
Mr, Michael Coombs 
72 East-400 South 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Coombs: 
In regard to your inquiry on the Checkrite stock, I can 
attest to the fact that I have been purchasing Checkrite 
stock for clients since September 17, 1987. I have 
purchased these shares for clients at various prices. The 
highest price I paid for the stock was at 1-5/16 on 
July 28, 1988 when I purchased 20,000 shares of Checkrite 
for various clients. 
I have enclosed my business card. Please let me know if 
I can be of further assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
l 
Penny G. Grace 
Asst. Vice President 
PGG/kk 
STATE OF
 / tfsi*«rJ 
COUNTY OF 5T*^Cmj 
PENNY GRACE BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT SHE PERSONALLY 
APPEARED BEFORE ME AND SWORE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT ON THIS 
JVt DAY OF ^ 7 / " W ^ 
UBLI~ NOTARY P LIC
MY COMMISSIONS EXPIRES / # / y .^f /rf^tf 
• * 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 
I AND II OF HER AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in Support of 
her Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint: 
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. 
'' ~~ ***5 fflf* 
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2. That your affiant has carefully read and helped prepare the Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on 
counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and in fact, she personally participated in the 
drafting thereof. That in an effort not to duplicate each of such enumerated Facts as 
detailed therein in this affidavit, your affiant can attest that each and every such Statement 
of Undisputed Fact therein as it pertains to her and her knowledge and experience as to 
how she was mistreated, misled, and "lulled" by certain of the defendants and, as to what 
otherwise transpired in this case, is true and correct in all particulars. 
3. That your affiant can attest that had she had a replacement certificate for 
Certificate 258 at July-end/August beginning 1988 she would have sold it. She further 
believes that she would have received the highest price that such stock reached in 1988, 
namely, $1-5/16ths per share, or, at a minimum, at least $1.25 per share. This is because 
your affiant knew of a pending Check Rite merger and she also had a brokerage account 
with Ernest Muth and was daily, if not very closely, following the price of the stock at that 
time. For instance, your affiant would have had an open order placed in which to sell the 
stock at that time. On the other hand, your affiant believes that had she had a replacement 
certificate at such time, she may have well received $1-5/16ths per share as set forth in the 
supporting affidavit of Penny Grace. Thus, your affiant believes that she is entitled to at 
least $10,000 in damages (8,000 shares x $1.25 per share) and perhaps $10,500 in damages 
(8,000 shares x $1-5/16ths per share). Your affiant further believes that she is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the highest legal rate or at a rate of no less that 12% and in her 
Amended Complaint she has indeed asked for pre-judgment interest. Lastly, your affiant 
has incurred attorney fees of at least $10,000 just trying to protect and enforce her rights, 
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and she believes that such incurred fees have caused her additional damage which would 
not have occured but for the wrongful conduct of the insurance company defendants and 
defendants Atlas and Check Rite. 
4. That your affiant believes that the defendants (with the exception of 
defendant Fletcher) had a duty to make her whole, a duty which included immediately going 
out into the market in May 1988 and buying 8,000 shares of stock to replace Certificate 258 
on which a lost instrument bond had been posted. That the misfortune of this entire case is 
that no responsible entity or person would help your affiant in any way and no one wanted 
to take responsibility for the problem until there was nothing left to do but file a lawsuit — 
and even then, the defendants would rather spend more money litigating this case than 
giving your affiant what she truly deserves. 
5. That your affiant believes that Guardalabene's investigation of the matter 
was exclusively for his own employer and Fletcher, the principal on the bond, and had 
nothing to do with her inasmuch as she is and was a totally innocent victim. That your 
affiant believes that Atlas, Check Rite, and the insurance company defendants have no 
excuse not to have immediately purchased 8,000 shares of replacement stock in May 1988 
and thereafter and immediately delivered the same to her. 
6. That your affiant does not believe that she had an obligation to go out and 
"cover", namely, to go out into the market herself and with her own money buy replacement 
stock for four reasons: (1) the problem was not her fault, (2) no one ever told her to "cover" 
or do anything else at any time, (3) she did not have the resources or cash on hand to have 
so bought replacement stock herself, and (4) she was not "short" the stock herself, namely, 
she had not sold it to or by or through anyone else and therefore she had no duty herself to 
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deliver 8,000 shares of replacement stock to any third party. That your affiant believes that 
had she been "short" 8,000 shares herself then she arguably would have had a duty to 
"cover", but under the circumstances of this case, she did not. That if anyone involved in 
the case had simply informed your affiant that your affiant should have "covered" — just to 
avoid this lawsuit your affiant would have done so. Unfortunately, no one did and your 
affiant had no reason to think she was acting other than as reasonably as could be 
expected of anyone. 
7. That your affiant has incurred additional damages of substantial 
unwarranted attorney fees, costs, including out-of-pocket expenses, and time expended 
and she believes that she is entitled to such additional damages on which there should be an 
evidentiary hearing. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of February, 1990. 
LeAnna Broadwater! Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th i£ / ' /c lay^Febrvtarv / fea 
My Commission Expires: 
B:AFUVT.8 
NarafyPffblic 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f/k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in opposition to 
certain defendants' February 6, 1990, motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I and 
II of her amended complaint: 
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1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. That your affiant 
incorporates by reference her affidavit filed in support of her cross-motion for summary 
judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint. 
2. That your affiant disputes the defendants' calculation of a "reasonable time" 
as set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
That your affiant believes that she could not have acted more reasonably under the facts 
and circumstances of this case and she believes that defendants Atlas, Check Rite, 
Northwestern National, and Old Republic did not. That in fact, none of the responsible 
parties would assist herr or do anything to resolve the problem and in fact there was nothing 
she could do under the circumstances other than eventually file this lawsuit. 
3. That your affiant believes that the conduct of the above-mentioned 
defendants "lulled" her into thinking that they would resolve the matter when they would not 
and did not, and if the Court invokes a "reasonable time" period after the conversion and 
notice of conversion, such a period should be tolled or extended by virtue of the 
misconduct of the above-named defendants — certainly not by any conduct on your 
affiant's part. That less than 90 days after the alleged date of conversion is a "reasonable 
time" in this case because your affiant acted reasonably during all that period and she does 
not know how it is possible that she could have acted more reasonably or diligently. That 
your affiant believes that no reasonable person in her shoes would have acted any 
differently and certainly no one, under the same circumstances, would have thought that he 
or she had an independent duty to effect "cover" and buy replacement stock, especially 
when no defendant informed your affiant of such and such only became an issue after this 
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case was filed. That your affiant believes that no reasonable person would have spent 
several thousand dollars of his or her own money buying replacement stock when any such 
person, and your affiant in particular, is the sole victim of the gross negligence, 
malfeasance, misfeasance, and overall intentional conduct of the defendants. 
4. Because your affiant acted reasonably and the culpable defendants did not, 
a "reasonable time" after the conversion and notice of conversion should include a time 
period up to and until July end/August beginning 1988 when the price of Check Rite stock 
admittedly attained its highest price of $1-5/16th per share. 
5. Lastly, your affiant should add that during one conversation with 
Guardalabene, Guardalabene tried to get your affiant to deal directly with Fletcher to 
resolve the problem. Your affiant responded that she did not think such was her 
responsibility. At that point, Guardalabene informed your affiant that because she was a 
"layman" and apparently didn't understand the situation, she should get a lawyer. Your 
affiant then understood Guardalabene to say that he would no longer deal with her directly 
until she consulted with legal counsel and had him talk directly to Guardalabene. Your 
affiant can attest that after she retained counsel, who in fact tried to negotiate 
unsuccessfully with Guardalabene, Guardalabene was still unwilling to resolve the problem 
and therefore, Guardalabene caused your affiant to incur unwarranted and unjustified 
attorney fees, not only prior to filing suit, but thereafter as well. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this/Tclay of February, 1990. 
/ ^ / 
LeAnna Broadwater, Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th i s / J cfey of February 1990 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
My Commission Expires: 
B:AFDVT.9 ' 
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Robert A. Burton, #0516 
Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corpo-
ration, doing business in Utah, 
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah 
corporation, CHECK RITE INTER-
NATIONAL, INC. f/k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL S. 
GUARDALABENE 
Civil No, 89-0902684-CV 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
COUNTY OF 
: SS 
) 
Affiant, Paul S. Guardalabene, having been first duly 
sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident of the State of Wisconsin and 
is at least 18 years of age. 
2. At all times pertinent affiant has served as 
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assistant claim attorney for Old Republic Surety Company, 
3. Affiant is responsible for supervising the claims 
handling process with respect to bond no. UMI 871385, and is 
authorized by Old Republic Surety to testify as to the facts set 
forth in this affidavit. 
4. In preparation of this affidavit, affiant has 
personally reviewed the claims file maintained at the offices of 
Old Republic Surety on bond no. UMI 871385. 
5. Affiant is aware that the documents found in said 
claims file are prepared in the normal course and scope of 
defendant's business and reflect transactions or occurrences 
contemporaneous to the entries found in said file. 
6. Defendant Old Republic received first notice of a 
potential claim being made on bond no. UMI 871385 on or about May 
20, 1988. On that date, Old Republic!s Salt Lake Office notified 
the home office of a potential claim on the bond. See Exhibit 1. 
7. On or about May 24, 1988, affiant spoke with 
defendant Scott Fletcher concerning the potential claim being 
made on the bond. 
8. On or about May 25, 1988, affiant wrote to Mr. 
Fletcher, requesting that he contact "the necessary parties to 
determine what happened and what can be done to settle this 
claim". See Exhibit 2. 
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9. On June 13, 1988, affiant corresponded with counsel 
for Mr. Fletcher requesting his assistance. See Exhibit 3. 
10. On or about July 19, 1988, affiant received 
plaintiff's July 11, 1988 correspondence advising affiant of 
plaintiff's interest in the subject stock certificate and 
informing affiant that the market for said stock appeared to be 
"firming up". See Exhibit 4. 
11. On or about July 20, 1988, affiant corresponded with 
counsel for Mr. Fletcher requesting that Fletcher respond to 
plaintiff's most recent letter. See Exhibit 5. 
12. On or about August 1, 1988, affiant received 
plaintiff's July 27, 1988 correspondence in which she supplied 
various documents evidencing her alleged ownership of the subject 
stock certificates. The materials supplied by plaintiff included 
reference to a Kasu Securities, Inc., a securities business in 
which plaintiff was serving as president and treasurer. See 
Exhibit 6. 
13. On August 8, 1988, affiant corresponded with 
plaintiff clearly indicating that Old Republic would handle its 
liability on the bond directly with the obligees under the bond. 
See Exhibit 7. 
14. On or about August 11, 1988, affiant corresponded 
with Mr. Franklin L. Kimball of the Atlas Stock Transfer Co. 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
concerning a potential claim being made under bond no, UMI 
871385, a copy of this correspondence was sent to plaintiff. See 
Exhibit 8. 
15. On or about August 23, 1988, affiant received an 
August 18, 1988 letter from Mr. Franklin L. Kimball of the Atlas 
Stock Transfer Corp., detailing the trading history of Cardinal 
Energy Corp. certificate no. 258. See Exhibit 9. 
16. On or about August 29, 1988, affiant once again 
corresponded with Mr. Franklin L. Kimball, a copy of his 
correspondence is once again being sent to plaintiff. See 
Exhibit 10. 
17. On or about September 26, 1988, affiant received a 
demand letter from plaintifffs current counsel, John Michael 
Coombs. See Exhibit 11. 
18. During the course of the claim history on bond no. 
UMI 871385, affiant recalls only two telephone conversations with 
plaintiff. 
19. Affiant recalls that plaintiff contacted him by 
telephone sometime in June 1988 to discuss the stop transfer 
order issued by Atlas Stock Transfer Corp. 
20. During the initial June 1988 conversation, affiant 
indicated that he would appreciate any assistance that plaintiff 
might give him investigating the matter further. Affiant 
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indicated that he would need various documents from plaintiff and 
other individuals before he could formally resolve any claim by 
an obligee on the bond. 
21. Since plaintiff represented herself to affiant as 
the holder of the lost security, affiant requested that plaintiff 
submit any documentation that she might have that would confirm 
her ownership of certificate no, 258. 
22. On or about July 27, 1988, plaintiff once again 
telephoned affiant to confirm that the documentation she had 
gathered would be sufficient for his needs. 
23. At no time did affiant ever inform plaintiff that 
she was an obligee or a third-party beneficiary under the bond. 
24. At no time did affiant consider it his duty to 
inform plaintiff of any legal duty or obligations that she might 
have as an interested party in the matter. 
25. At all times during their dealings, affiant 
considered plaintiff as an interested party who might be willing 
to assist him in investigating the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the appearance of the lost security. 
26. At no time during my dealings with plaintiff did 
affiant indicate or infer that plaintiff had a right to recover 
any damages directly from Old Republic. 
27. At no time during affiant's dealings with plaintiff 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did affiant intend to or do anything to stall or delay the claims handling 
process and the ultimate resolution of the potential obligees' claims 
under the subject bond. 
28. At no time did affiant intend that any of his actions lull 
plaintiff into inaction with respect to any legal duties or obligations 
she might have had to enter the market place in order to mitigate her 
damages. 
DATED this « ^ / ^ d a y of ^ / ^ ^ , 1990. 
Patul S. Guardalabene 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s ^ ^ d a y of ^Vu^y^y > 1990. 
H / 
Rotary Public 
^Residing at )^?'^"a^'£> ^  /«'£< 
My Commission Expires: 
tio&V Publico Q<\>:,y.-.-,,, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy gf the above and 
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid, this day 
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of March, 1990, to: 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake T. Ostler 
KIRTON & MCCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Fletcher 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Larry G. Reed 
PARSONS 8c CROWTHER 
Attorneys for Atlas Stock Transfer Corp. 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Philip R. Hughes, Esq. 
Attorney for Check Rite 
844 South 200 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
c 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1. 1990, 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several 
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters 
judgment and further orders as follows: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action is denied. 
Ti.- o' J.».:•'.:& District 
/~~. UUN. 6 1990 
3 / : 
' i^j iny Clerk 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended 
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of 
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further, 
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date 
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken 
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in 
support of such an award. 
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an 
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and 
Penny Grace is denied. 
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike 
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial 
summary judgment is granted. 
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her 
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied. 
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants 
and their counsel is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. 
DATED this t u day of June, 1990. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In re: Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al. 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Third District Cour 
Judge Raymond S. Uno ' 
0200:JUDG.l 
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Third Ju,j ... t->:S:riC( 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
SEP 1 7 13S0 
PofAjiy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL.DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
A hearing having been held in the above-entitled Court on September 6, 1990, 
at the hour of 9:30 a.m., on the issue of attorney's fees; John Michael Coombs having 
appeared for plaintiff Broadwater; Stephen J. Trayner having appeared on behalf of 
defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National Insurance Company of 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Larry G. Reed having appeared for defendant Atlas Stock Transfer; 
- 1 -
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no appearance having been made by defendant Check Rite International, Inc., in that its A 
Local , \ C
 r tf|0$ 
local counsel claims to have had no notice of the hearing citJdtiCOUrS&y ^o\r \ i 
C K e c k R;V-d U)C\s> Uot r jv/cluciflf l f ^ w + k t rtl^i MNa C l f i / 1 i \ * c 4 r ^ -
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the affidavits and 
memorandums on file; it having also heard the parties' oral stipulation that plaintiff is bound 
by the terms of her contingency fee arrangement with her counsel, and, in that regard, the 
Court having further acknowledged that plaintiff has a one-third (1 /3)/two-thirds (2/3's) 
contingency tee arrangement witn her counsel, as set form in Exnibit "A" attached hereto 
and incorporated by reference, and good cause further appearing, the Court ruled as 
follows: 
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is hereby awarded a judgment against defendants 
Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., for attorney's fees in the amount of 
one-third (1 /3) of the amount of the judgment entered against such defendants on June 6, 
1990, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated into this 
judgment by reference as Exhibit "B". 
DATED t h i s / 2 3a7of September, 1990. 
THIRD DISTRICT COUR1 
Third District Judge'Raymond S. Uno 
Approved as to form: 
PM>fi. L 
Philip R. Hughes / 
Counsel to Check Rite International, Inc. 
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March 22, 1989 
Mr. John Michael Coombs, Lawyer 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Michael: 
I have searched my telephone records and, apparently, have given 
you all the information on calls I made to Guardalabene. 
I have recieved the most recent offer and find it absolutely ri-
diculous. As you will note, in previous correspondence I sent to 
Guardalabene, dated July 11th, he had proposed over the phone to 
pay me the amount I had paid for the stock for settlement, which 
was $2,480, and I flatly refused and asked that he just simply re-
place the stock and allow me to sell it at whatever price I chose. 
That is why I am so adamant about their paying me the highest price 
the stock traded at plus punitive damages or attorneys fees because 
of their unwillingness to settle the matter with me at that time. 
I'm not sure we want to go into such detail with Fletcher, but you're 
the expert and I will leave that decision up to you. You had men-
tioned previously about asking for a Summary Judgment. What is your 
thinking on that now? 
Below I have outlined our agreement the way I believe we discussed 
it. If it is satisfactory to you, please make a copy, sign it and 
return for my files. 
I have previously submitted a $1,500 retainer to you which is to 
be deducted from your total fees. 
It is agreed that you are entitled to one third of whatever is re-
covered. However, it is further agreed that if it is necessary to 
go to trial then you will be entitled to half of whatever is re-
covered. Except if punitive damages are awarded, I will be entitled 
to the first $8,000 of whatever is awarded and then we will split 
the remainder on a 50/50 basis. 
Sinperely, 
lr 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS 
LeAnna (Broadwater) Robbins 
^7^-&rLs<S 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
ftiCD OlSTfUST SQc'BT 
Third J..«.1»'.:ial District 
^ |J"No6 1990 
By \ JL^ 
J ^C^puty Cftrfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1. 1990. 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several 
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters 
Judgment and further orders as follows: 
1. Defendants* motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action is denied. 
- 1 ti ftf~ JL 
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2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended 
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of 
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further, 
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date 
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken 
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in 
support of such an award. 
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an 
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff. Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and 
Penny Grace is denied. 
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike 
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial 
summary judgment is granted. 
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her 
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied. 
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants 
and their counsel is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. 
DATED this &® day of June. 1990. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corpo-
ration, doing business in Utah, 
ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a Utah 
Corporation, CHECK RITE INTER-
NATIONAL, INC. f/k/a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. FLETCHER, 
a Utah resident, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 
RULE 54(b) MOTION TO 
CERTIFY JUDGMENTS AS 
FINAL 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
The Motion of defendants Atlas Stock Transfer Corp., Old 
Republic Surety, North Western National Insurance Company and Check 
Rite International, Inc. to Certify Judgment as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having come on for 
decision before the above entitled Court on October 18, 1990, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding, and plaintiff appearing 
1 
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through counsel, J, Michael Coombs, defendant Atlas Stock Transfer 
Corp. appearing through counsel, Larry G. Reed, defendants Old 
Republic Surety and North Western National Insurance Company 
appearing through counsel, Stephen J, Trayner, and defendant Check 
Rite International through counsel, Phillip R. Hughes, and the 
Court having reviewed the Memoranda supporting and opposing said 
Motion and having heard the arguments and representations of 
counsel, and it appearing to the Court that multiple claims for 
relief have been presented in this action, that the Judgments dated 
June 6 and September 17, 1990 would be appealable but for the fact 
that other claims and parties remain in this action, and that there 
is no just reason for delay and further that the decision set forth 
in this Court's Memorandum Decision, dated May 24, 1990, con-
stitutes a final determination of plaintiff's claims as set forth 
in Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and good cause 
appearing therefor; 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS and certifies that the Judgment 
entered by this Court on June 6, 1990 and the Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees, entered on September 17, 1990, are both final and 
appealable within the meaning of Rule 54 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this // day of October, 1990. 
fr /y 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
u • : > : 
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J. JMicml^ei^obin&s 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Attorney for Old Republic Surety 
and North Western National Insurance 
UMAJJ^ 
PhilTir^'R/ Hughes 
Attorney for Check/^ite In te rna t iona l , Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this / / day of October, 
1990, to: 
J. Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant Fletcher 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip R. Hughes 
Attorney for Check Rite International, Inc. 
844 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen J. Trayner 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Old Republic Surety 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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